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Abstract
The electricity industry has been experiencing fundamental changes over the past
decade. Two of the arguably most significant driving forces are the integration of
renewable energy resources into the electric power system and the creation of the
deregulated electricity markets. Many new challenges arise. In this thesis, we focus on
two important ones: How to reliably operate the power system under high penetration
of intermittent and uncertain renewable resources and uncertain demand: and how to
design an electricity market that considers both efficiency and fairness. We present
some new advances in these directions.
In the first part of the thesis, we focus on the first issue in the context of the unit
commitment (UC) problem, one of the most critical daily operations of an electric
power system. Unit commitment in large scale power systems faces new challenges
of increasing uncertainty from both generation and load. We propose an adaptive
robust model for the security constrained unit commitment problem in the presence
of nodal net load uncertainty. We develop a practical solution methodology based
on a combination of Benders decomposition type algorithm and outer approximation
techniques. We present an extensive numerical study on the real-world large scale
power system operated by the ISO New England (ISO-NE). Computational results
demonstrate the advantages of the robust model over the traditional reserve adjust-
ment approach in terms of economic efficiency, operational reliability, and robustness
to uncertain distributions.
In the second part of the thesis, we are concerned with a geometric character-
ization of the performance of adaptive robust solutions in a multi-stage stochastic
optimization problem. We study the notion of finite adaptability in a general setting
of multi-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization. We show a significant role that
geometric properties of uncertainty sets, such as symmetry, play in determining the
power of robust and finitely adaptable solutions. Ve show that a class of finitely
adaptable solutions is a good approximation for both the multi-stage stochastic as
well as the adaptive optimization problem. To the best of our knowledge, these are
the first approximation results for multi-stage problems in such generality. Moreover,
the results and the proof techniques are quite general and extend to include important
constraints such as integrality and linear conic constraints.
In the third part of the thesis, we focus on how to design an auction and pricing
scheme for the day-ahead electricity market that achieves both economic efficiency
and fairness. The work is motivated by two outstanding problems in the current
practice - the uplift problem and equitable selection problem. The uplift problem is
that the electricity payment determined by the electricity price cannot fully recover
the production cost (especially the fixed cost) of some committed generators, and
therefore the ISOs make side payments to such generators to make up the loss. The
equitable selection problem is how to achieve fairness and integrity of the day-ahead
auction in choosing from multiple (near) optimal solutions. We offer a new perspective
and propose a family of fairness based auction and pricing schemes that resolve these
two problems. We present numerical test result using ISO-NE's day-ahead market
data. The proposed auction- pricing schemes produce a frontier plot of efficiency
versus fairness, which can be used as a vaulable decision tool for the system operation.
Thesis Supervisor: Dimitris Bertsimas
Title: Boeing Leaders for Global Operations Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Reliable Operation of the Electric Power Sys-
tems Under Supply and Demand Uncertainty
Over the past decade, significant new development has taken place in the electricity
industry around the world. One of the most important driving forces is the move to-
ward alternative energy resources. Indeed, over the past decade, tremendous amount
of effort and resources have been invested in developing renewable energy technologies
and installing renewable energy generating plants. Many countries in the world have
established alternative energy mandate. For instance, 24 states in the US have renew-
able portfolio standards, and the European Union has a mandate of 20% electricity
generated from renewable energy resources by the year 2020. To keel) the development
of renewable energy sustainable and to realize its full potential, new challenges to the
operations of electric power systems have to be solved. In particular, the following
issue becomes critical:
* How to reliably operate the power system under high penetration of intermittent
and uncertain renewable resources as well as uncertain demand.
To take full advantage of the renewable energy resources, the bulk power system
needs to be operated in a reliable, resilient, and robust way. This need is particularly
felt in the day-ahead power system scheduling problem, i.e., the so-called security
constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problem. The SCUC is a key daily operation
of any large scale electric power systerm in both vertically integrated industry and
deregulated electricity markets. It has been one of the most challenging problems
in the power system operation, due to its large scale, discrete nature, and complex
constraints. Since the unit commitment decisions have to be made a day before
the real-time operation, the uncertainty in the generation and demand forecast is
a significant factor that complicates the planning, especially with the fast growing
renewable energy penetration and demand-side price sensitive response.
The current operational practice heavily relies on deterministic decision models
and heuristic, inflexible reserve requirement [45, 85], which makes it difficult and
economically inefficient to adjust to the emerging system of growing uncertainty in
both supply and demand. Most of the existing proposals that explicitly deal with
uncertainty use the stochastic optimization approach, which requires a probability
distribution of the uncertainty, and often relies on sampling discrete scenarios of the
uncertainty realizations [27, 82, 68, 87, 86]. This approach has practical limitations
in the application to large scale power systenis. In particular, it may be difficult
to identify an accurate probability distribution of the uncertainty. Also, stochastic
UC solutions only provide probabilistic guarantees to the system reliability. It often
requires large number of scenario samples to obtain a reasonable reliability guarantee,
which results in intensive computation. The limitations of the current deterministic
approach and the stochastic optimization model calls for a new methodology for unit
commitment operations.
1.2 Fairness and Efficiency in Electric Market De-
sign
Another important driving force of the significant development in the electricity in-
dustry is the creation of deregulated electricity markets. Since the 1990's, the elec-
tricity industry has undergone deregulation and restructuring in several countries
such as UK, Spain, Chile, Brazil, among others, and several regions of the United
States. Vertically integrated utility companies are restructured; electricity produc-
tion and transmission are separated into different enterprises; Independent System
Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are established
to manage the regional transmission grids and wholesale electricity markets. Today,
ten ISOs and RTOs serve two-thirds of the electricity consumers in the United States
and more than half of Canada's population. Although more than two decades have
passed, some fundamental issues in electricity market design still remain in active
debate, attracting considerable attention from both academia and industry [79].
The day-ahead (DA) market design is one of the most difficult among electricity
market design problems. In the current reality of deregulated electricity markets,
the Independent System Operators (ISOs) adopt the social welfare maximization
principle in solving a unit commitment problem and a marginal cost pricing scheme
to determine the electricity price as the incremental cost of producing one more unit
of electricity. A long noticed shortcoming of this approach is the so-called uplift
problen, i.e., the electricity payment determined by the electricity price cannot fully
recover the production cost (especially the fixed cost) of some committed generators,
and therefore the ISOs make side payments to such generators to make up the loss.
Recent proposals have focused on augmenting the current social welfare niaxi-
mization auction and marginal cost pricing scheme by imposing prices for integer
decisions [67, 88], or directly using the Lagrangian multipliers of the mixed integer
unit commitment problem to form the electricity price [50, 44). One drawback of the
first approach is that the introduced energy prices are sometimes hard to interpret
and implement in practice, in a sense, they are similar to the uplift payment in na-
ture. The second approach minimizes the total uplift payment, however, its definition
of uplift is different from the one used in current practice, also it does not fully re-
solve the problem - uplift payment can still be positive. Computationally, it requires
solving a Lagrangian relaxation of the mixed-integer unit commitment problem, and
potentially a primal version of the unit connitmnent as well.
Another long standing issue in the current practice is how to choose one market
clearing solution from multiple optimal or near-optimal solutions [53, 48]. We call
this equitable selection problem. Although all solution candidates have the same level
of system welfare, selecting one solution against others can have significant financial
implications on individual generators and consumers. Current practice lacks clear-
cut criteria in choosing from potentially numerous solution candidates. In fact, even
computing all the solution candidates is a highly nontrivial task.
This thesis aims to provide new perspective and proposals to these issues. In our
consideration, both problems are symptoms of a deeper unfairness issue: for the uplift
problem, some generators that produce electricity make no profit, while other market
participants, especially on the consumer side, collect considerable utility surpluses;
for the second problem, choosing one solution from others can clearly cause fairness
and inequity concerns among market participants. Thus, the following question seems
to bear significant implication on the electricity market design problem:
How to design an auction and pricing scheme for the day-ahead market that
achieves both economic efficiency and fairness.
1.3 Exciting Development in Operations Research:
Robust and Adaptive Optimization
As the electricity industry is witnessing exciting development, the operations research
community has also been making significant progress, especially in the area of mul-
tistage decision making under uncertainty. Multistage optimization problems under
uncertainty are prevalent in numerous scientific and engineering disciplines (includ-
ing electric power systems) and have attracted researchers from diverse backgrounds.
Several solution approaches have been proposed including exact and approximate
dynamic programming, stochastic programming, and simulation-based methods. As
early as 1970s, Soyster [80] and Falk [36] considered static linear programming prob-
lems with uncertain matrix coefficients, right-hand side, and cost coefficients. The
goal was to find a solution that is feasible for all realizations of uncertainty to mini-
mize the worst case cost. This new solution concept remained almost unnoticed until
the late 1990's, when a series of papers by Ben-tal and Nemirovski [11, 12, 13], Ben-
tal et. al. [1], El Ghaoui and Lebret [40], El Ghaoui et. al. [41], Bertsimas and Sim
[21, 22], and Bertsimas et. al. [30] considerably extended the previous work in linear
programs to much more general convex optimization problems. Robust Optimization
has since become an active research field. Later, the framework is further extended
by a sequence of papers by Ben-tal et. al. [10, 7, 8], in which the decision is allowed
to be made after the uncertainty was revealed, thus introducing adaptable policies
and Adaptive Optimization. It was shown that an arbitrary adaptable policy typi-
cally results in intractable problems, and proposed a special class of affine decision
rules. In the work by Bertsimas and Caramanis [16], a hierarchy of finitely adaptable
policies with increasing adaptability was proposed.
As is shown, it is an exciting time to conduct interdisciplinary research on the
boundary of electric power systems and operations research. Indeed, this thesis
presents some advances in the above two important directions for power systems
operation and electricity market design, using the recent development in Robust and
Adaptive Optimization. In particular,. we develop a new methodology for the secu-
rity constrained unit commitment operation that is both robust and adaptable to the
uncertain supply and demand. We propose a new design for the day-ahead electricity
market that explicitly considers both efficiency and fairness. We also present a con-
tribution to the theory of multi-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization, where we
found a tight geometric characterization of the power of finitely adaptable solutions
for mutli-stage stochastic optimization problems.
1.4 The Structure and Contributions of the Thesis
The structure and the main contributions of the thesis are summarized below.
* In Chapter 2 of the thesis, we focus our attention on the security constrained
unit commitment problem.
1. We formulate a two-stage adaptive robust optimization model for the se-
curity constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problem with nodal net load
uncertainty. It is a first such SCUC model using adaptive robust optimiza-
tion and incorporating all types of constraints considered in the real world,
such as network, contingency, reserve, ramp-rate, and all other physical,
inter-temporal constraints. The first-stage commitment decision is robust
and the second-stage dispatch solution is fully adaptive to all variations
of uncertainty. This endorses the solution with both robustness and high
adaptability. Special techniques are taken to further reduce the conser-
vativeness of the solution by controlling the size of the uncertainty region
and choosing proper budget of uncertainty levels using the probability law.
2. Due to the complexity and novelty of the adaptive robust model, efficient
algorithms are in great need. We develop a practical two-level solution
algorithm. The algorithm combines a cutting plane type method with
heurstic speed-up in the outer level with an efficient approximate algo-
rithm in the inner level. This algorithm can be viewed as a further gener-
alization to the traditional Generalized Benders Decomposition framework,
where in our case the objective function is given implicitly by a nontriv-
ial bilinear optimization problem. Our algorithm can be useful to many
other problems, where the two-stage adaptive robust optimization model
is applicable, such as capacity expansion, resource planning, and airline
management.
3. We conduct extensive numerical tests on the large scale power system op-
erated by ISO New England with all detailed constraints used in reality
(reserve, transmission, ramping rate, constraint violation penalty, etc).
Based on the numerical results, we compare the performance of the adap-
tive robust UC model to the current practice in three aspects, namely
economic efficiency, real-time operation reliability, and robustness to prob-
ability distributions of the uncertainty. The numerical test demonstrates
the clear advantages of the adaptive robust models in all three aspects.
* Chapter 3 of the thesis is of a theoretical nature, but was originally motivated
by the above adaptive robust SCUC model.
1. We discover a significant role that geometric quantities, such as the sym-
metry of the uncertainty set, play in characterizing the performance of
the finite adaptability solutions in multistage stochastic optimization and
adaptive optimization. In particular, in both two-stage and multi-stage
models, the optimal objective value of a finitely adaptive solution is upper
bounded by (1 + p/s) times the optimal value of a multistage stochas-
tic optimization solution, where s is the symmetry of the uncertainty set
and p E [0, 1] relates how far the set is removed from the origin. The
significance of the result is that it shows the finitely adaptive solution is
a good approximation of a multistage stochastic solution, e.g., when the
uncertainty set is symmetric (s = 1, we have a 2-approximation). While
multistage stochastic optimization is essentially intractable, finitely adapt-
able optimization is computationally tractable.
2. The above geometric result opens the way to characterize performance for
many structured uncertainty set. We investigate and give many examples,
such as budgeted uncertainty set, symmetric sets, uncertainty set moti-
vated by Central Limit Theorem, etc. This provides a useful guideline to
the modelers in choosing and designing proper uncertainty sets.
3. We extend our results to general linear conic inequalities, thus include the
important case of multistage optimization with positive semidefinite (SDP)
constraints. We also extend our results to problems with integral decisions
in the first-stage, which include capacity planning type problems.
* The above two parts correspond to the robustness and adaptability in the thesis
title. Chapter 4 of the thesis deals with the design of an efficient and fair
day-ahead (DA) electricity market.
1. We propose and investigate the notion of -fairness that encompasses a
full spectrum of fairness proposals. The case 3 = 0 corresponds to cur-
rent practice of maximizing social welfare, whereas # = 1 corresponds to a
solution that maximizes the minimum utility among market participants,
the so-called max-min fairness. Under the max-min fairness scheme, every
market participant is guaranteed a nonnegative surplus, so no side pay-
ments are needed, and thus the uplift problem is naturally solved. We
broadly investigate various properties, computational methods, and eco-
nomic implications of the max-min fairness scheme.
2. By varying #, we investigate the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of
the #-fairness auction and pricing scheme. We formulate a family of mixed
integer optimization models that explicitly parametrizes this tradeoff. The
solutions for different parameter values are used to generate an efficiency-
fairness curve. Such a frontier plot illustrates a flexible tradeoff between
efficiency and fairness achieved by our proposal, and thus, it can be used to
facilitate the ISO's decision-making in choosing an appropriate operating
point of its market. A particular revealing observation from the efficiency-
fairness curve is that the current operational practice (0 = 0) is not Pareto
efficient, and significant improvement can be achieved by our proposed
schemes.
3. We demonstrate that there is a 1o E (0, 1), at which the social welfare is
as high as current practice, while the fairness property is strictly better
and the side payments are strictly lower than current practice. This shows
that, in accordance with well formulated fairness principle, the -fairness
tradeoff scheme with / = 30o automatically selects the most fair solution
from potentially numerous maximum social welfare solution candidates.
This provides a solution to the second issue of the current practice to
achieving fairness and integrity in choosing from multiple optimal social
welfare solutions.
4. We investigate the convergent behavior of /-fairness as 3 -* 0, and fur-
ther propose a new pricing scheme called efficient fairness (EF) scheme,
which decouples from the MaxSW auction and simultaneously achieves the
maximum social welfare and max-min fairness. It also enjoys easier com-
putation (only solves one simple linear program). We also formally show
that among all pricing schemes, the EF pricing scheme is the most likely
to eliminate uplift payment. When uplift is unavoidable under any pricing
scheme, the EF scheme minimizes the largest uplift payment.
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Chapter 2
Adaptive Robust Optimization for
Security Constrained Unit
Commitment Problems
2.1 Introduction
Unit commitment (UC) is one of the most critical decision processes performed by
system operators in deregulated electricity markets as well as in vertically integrated
utilities. The objective of the UC problem is to find a unit commitment schedule
that minimizes the commitment and dispatch costs of meeting the forecasted system
load, taking into account various physical, inter-temporal constraints for generating
resources, transmission, and system reliability requirements.
During the normal real-time operation, system operator dispatches the committed
generation resources to satisfy the actual demand and reliability requirements. In the
event that the actual system condition significantly deviates from the expected con-
dition, system operator needs to take corrective actions such as committing expensive
fast-start generators, voltage reduction, or load shedding in emergency situation to
maintain system security. The main causes of the unexpected events come from the
uncertainties associated with the load forecast error, changes of system interchange
schedules, generator's failure to follow dispatch signals, and unexpected transmission
and generation outages.
In recent years, higher penetration of variable generation resources (such as wind
power, solar power, and distributed generators) and more price-responsive demand
participation have posed new challenges to the unit commitment process, especially
in the independent system operator (ISO) managed electricity markets. It becomes
important for the ISOs to have an effective methodology that produces robust unit
commitment decisions and ensures the system reliability in the presence of increasing
real-time uncertainty.
Previous studies of uncertainty management in the UC problem can be divided
into two groups. The first group commits and dispatches generating resources to meet
a deterministic forecasted load, and handles uncertainty by imposing conservative re-
serve requirements. The second group relies on stochastic optimization techniques.
The first group, so-called the reserve adjustment method, is widely used in today's
power industry. Much of research along this vein, including [2, 24, 23, 43), has fo-
cused on analyzing the levels of reserve requirements based on deterministic criteria,
such as a loss of the largest generator or system import change. Such an approach
is easy to implement in practice. However, committing extra generation resources
as reserves could be an economically inefficient way to handle uncertainty, especially
when the reserve requirement is determined largely by some ad-hoc rules, rather than
a systematic analysis. Also, since the UC decision only considers the expected oper-
ating condition, even with enough reserve available, the power system may still suffer
capacity inadequacy when the real-time condition, such as load, deviates significantly
from the expected value.
The stochastic optimization approach explicitly incorporates a probability distri-
bution of the uncertainty, and often relies on presampling discrete scenarios of the
uncertainty realizations [27, 82, 68, 87, 86]. This approach has some practical limi-
tations in the application to large scale power systems. First, it may be difficult to
identify an accurate probability distribution of the uncertainty. Second, stochastic
UC solutions only provide probabilistic guarantees to the system reliability. To obtain
a reasonably high guarantee requires large number of scenario samples, which results
in a problem that is computationally intensive. To improve the robustness of stochas-
tic UC solutions, Ruiz et al. [74 proposed a hybrid approach combining the reserve
requirement and stochastic optimization methods. A recent work [35] proposed an
interesting framework that combines uncertainty quantification with stochastic op-
timization. This framework could also be integrated with the robust optimization
formulation proposed in this chapter.
Robust optimization has recently gained substantial popularity as a modeling
framework for optimization under parameter uncertainty, led by the work [11, 12,
13, 1, 40, 41, 21, 22, 30]. The approach is attractive in several aspects. First, it
only requires moderate information of the underlying uncertainty, such as the mean
and the range of the uncertain data; and the framework is flexible enough that the
modeler can always incorporate more probabilistic information such as covariance to
the uncertainty model, when such information is available. Second, the robust model
constructs an optimal solution that immunizes against all realizations of the uncertain
data within a deterministic uncertainty set. Such a robustness is a desirable feature,
especially when the penalty associated with infeasible solutions is very high, as the
case in the power system operations. Hence, the concept of robust optimization is
consistent with the risk-averse fashion in which the power systems are operated. There
has been a broad variety of applications of robust optimization in engineering and
management sciences (such as structural design, integrated circuit design, statistics,
inventory management, to name a few. See [9] and references therein).
In this chapter, we propose a two-stage adaptive robust optimization model for
the security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problem, where the first-stage
UC decision and the second-stage dispatch decision are robust against all uncertain
nodal net load realizations. Furthermore, the second-stage dispatch solution has full
adaptability to the uncertainty. The critical constrains such as network constraints,
ramp rate constraints and transmission security constraints are incorporated into
the proposed model as well. It is key to design a proper uncertainty set to control
the conservatism of the robust solution. We use a special technique proposed in
[21, 22] for this purpose. We develop a practical solution method, and extensively
test the method on a real-world power system. Papers [70, 89] proposed similar robust
optimization UC models. However, their proposals ignored reserve constraints and
did not study critical issues such as the impact of robust solutions on system efficiency,
operational stability, and robustness of the UC solutions against different probability
distributions of uncertainty, neither did they compare the robust UC model with
the current practice in a real world power system. Our research was conducted and
written independently of the works in [70, 89]. The main contributions of our work
are summarized below.
1. We formulate a two-stage adaptive robust optimization model for the SCUC
problem. Given a pre-specified nodal net load uncertainty set, the two-stage
adaptive robust UC model obtains an "immunized against uncertainty" first-
stage commitment decision and a second-stage adaptive dispatch actions by
minimizing the sum of the unit commitment cost and the dispatch cost under
the worst-case realization of uncertain nodal net load. The nodal net load uncer-
tainty set models variable resources such as non-dispatchable wind generation,
real-time demand variation, and interchange uncertainty. The parameters in
the uncertainty set provide control over the conservatism of the robust solution.
2. We develop a practical solution methodology to solve the adaptive robust model.
In particular, we design a two-level decomposition approach. A Benders decom-
position type algorithm is employed to decompose the overall problem into a
master problem involving the first-stage commitment decisions at the outer
level and a bilinear subproblem associated with the second-stage dispatch ac-
tions at the inner level, which is solved by the outer approximation approach
[32, 37]. The proposed solution method applies to general polyhedral uncer-
tainty sets. We present a computational study that shows the efficiency of the
method. Besides the unit commitment studied in this chapter, the proposed
mixed-integer adaptive robust model is applicable to many two-stage decision
making problems, such as robust inventory management problems, robust loca-
tion transportation problems, etc. The efficient solution methodology developed
here, therefore, may be of interest to a much wider community.
3. We conduct extensive numerical experiments on the real-world large scale power
system operated by the ISO New England. We study the performance of the
adaptive robust model and provide detailed comparison with the current prac-
tice, the reserve adjustment approach. Specifically, we analyze the merit of the
adaptive robust model from three aspects: economic efficiency, contribution to
real-time operation reliability, and robustness to probability distributions of the
uncertainty. The extensive computational results show that the adaptive robust
UC model outperforms the current practice in all three aspects. This clearly
demonstrates the advantages of the adaptive robust UC model.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the deterministic SCUC
formulation. Section 2.3 introduces the two-stage adaptive robust SCUC formulation.
Section 2.4 discusses the solution methodology. Section 2.5 presents computational
results, including a discussion on the proper way to choose the level of conservatism
in the robust model. Section 2.6 concludes with discussion.
2.2 The Deterministic SCUC Problem
For the unit commitment decision making, the system operator usually has access
to a wide range of detailed data listed below, including economic data of generator's
production costs or supply curve in a market setting, physical characteristics of each
generator, expected load forecast, system reserve requirement, network parameters
and transmission line ratings.
" N,, Nd, Nb. NI. T: The number of generators, loads, nodes, transmission lines,
and time periods (in hours).
. Nl?9, , !N A,. T: The corresponding sets of generators, loads, nodes, transmis-
sion lines, and time periods (in hours).
" S". G', Fj: Start-up, shut-down, no-load costs of generator i at time t.
" C(-): Variable cost of generator i at time t as a function of production levels.
max min
" pa I pn Maximum and minimum production levels of generator i (usually
called Ecomax and Ecomin, respectively).
" RUj, RD': Ramp-up, ramp-down rates of generator i at time t.
" MinUpi, MinDowni: Minimum-up and minimum-down times of generator i.
" f"ax: Flow limit on transmission line 1 in base case.
e f,"nax: Flow limit on transmission line 1 in contingency i (i.e. line i is dropped).
" BP, Bd: Network incidence matrices for generators and load.
* a,: Network shift factor vector for line 1 for the base case.
" a11 : Network shift factor vector for line I in contingency i.
" d': Expected demand at node j, time t.
" Nr: The set of system reserve requirements Mr = {TMSR, T10, T30}.
" A: The set of reserve products A = {TMSR, TMNSR, TMOR}.
" Ak: The set of reserve products needed to satisfy reserve requirement k E V,:
ATmIs =- {TMSR}, AT1o = {TMSR,TMNSR}, AT30 = {TMSR,TMNSR,TMOR}.
i : Reserve capacity of generator i, requirement k E AN, time t.
t qik: System reserve requirement of k E N,, time t.
The system operator in the current practice commits extra generation resource, called
reserve, in the day-ahead scheduling. The reserve capacity will be available to the sys-
tem operator in the real-time operation to prepare for unexpected loss of generators
or other system disruptions. According to how fast the reserve capacity can respond
to the emergency, there are three important types of reserves: ten-minute spinning
reserve (TMSR), ten-minute nonspinning reserve (TMNSR), and thirty-minute op-
erating reserve (TMOR). Other types of reserves exist, such as regulation service
(automatic generation control) which responds to frequency changes in the system
second by second, and supplement reserve.
The decision variables of the unit commitment problem are:
* xi C {0, 1}: If generator i is on at time t, xt = 1; otherwise x' = 0.
t u E {0, 1}: If generator i is turned on at time t, n = 1; otherwise u = 0.
* vo C {0, 1}: If generator i is turned down at time t, v = 1; otherwise = 0.
* pi [0, oo): Production of generator i at time t.
* q a C [0, oo): Reserve of generator i, type a E A, time t.
A standard deterministic UC model is formulated below [45, 85].
T Ng
min x Fit + ut S + vtG' + C (p|)x Yuv q
x -x +'U > 0,
xx + vu, 2 0,
x1  xt - xT, VT C [t + 1, min{t + MinUpi - 1, T}], t E [2, T],
x3 - x <1- X. VT E [t + 1. min{t + MinDwi - 1, T}j t E [2, T],
Ng Nd
p= 1 ,'
=1 j=1
Vt E T,
- RD < pt pt RU|, ViE A,,t E T,
- f"[ < a'(Bp t - B(d') < j.ax Vt E Tl E A,
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
fPi < a'(Bppt - Bad') < ftj.." Vt E T, E CT,i C N,
pnu " p + q+ , <Pax Vi E Ng, t E T,
qqk a tC ke,.aE A
q 2 W, Vt E, kE.N,
N ~g a c-Ak
q i
a(E Ak
V E g, t E T. k c r.
(2.9)
(2.10)
(2.11)
(2.12)
V1 (E No,,t 1, T,
Vi E Nr, t (E T,
Eq. (2.2) and (2.3) are logic constraints between on and off status and the turn-
on and turn-off actions. In particular, a generator i is turned on at time t ut = 1 if
and only if x 1 = 0, Xz = 1. Similarly, a generator i is turned off at time t if and
only if X'-1 = 1, IX = 0. Eq. (2.4) and (2.5) are constraints of minimum up and
minimum down times for each generator, i.e. if a generator is turned on at time t,
then it must remain on at least for the next (MinUpi - 1) periods, and similar for
the shutdown constraint. There are multiple ways to model these constraints. The
specific form that we use here follow the formulation proposed in [83]. The convex
hull of the binary variable x defined by Eq. (2.4)-(2.5) is explicitly characterized in
[58]. Furthermore, the convex hull of the binary variables (x, u) defined by Eq. (2.2)-
(2.3) and Eq. (2.4)-(2.5) is characterized in [71]. In the software implementation of
our robust unit commitment model, we use the strong formulation proposed in [71].
Eq. (2.6) is the energy balance equation that matches the system level supply
and load at each time period. Eq. (2.7) is the ramp rate constraint, i.e. the speed at
which a generator can increase or decrease its production level is bounded in a range.
Notice that the ramping constraint is a complicating constraint that couples many
consecutive time periods.
Eq. (2.8) is the transmission flow constraint for the base case, where all trans-
mission lines are functioning. Eq. (2.9) is the transmission line constraint for the
i-th contingency where transmission line i is tripped. In this situation. the network
topology is changed, so are the shift factor asi and flow limits fj'a. Eq. (2.8) and
(2.9) are the DC approximation of the nonlinear AC power flow equations. In Ap-
pendix, we review the physical laws that govern the power flows and give a derivation
of the DC approximation from the the AC model. Incorporating the nonlinear AC
flow equations into the unit commitment problem would result in a nonlinear mixed-
integer optimization problem, which is significantly more difficult to solve than a
linear imixed-integer problem. In the literature, it has been standard to use the DC
model in the unit commitment problem. It remains a challenging problem to incorpo-
rate AC power flow model into the economic dispatch problem where the commitment
variables are fixed.
Eq. (2.10) is the constraint that the sum of the production output and the reserve
should be within the upper and lower bounds for each generator. Eq. (2.11) describes
the requirement on how much reserve the system should have reserve category k E Ar
at time t. Eq. (2.12) says generator i can provide at most qi,k,t for reserve requirement
k at time t. Since reserve also takes up the generation capacity,
The variable production cost, or the supply curve in a market setting, C(pi) is
an increasing convex piece-wise linear function of the production output pt. In the
ISO-NE's day-ahead energy market, each generator is allowed to submit a supply
curve of up to 20 pieces.
To simplify the notation, we present a compact matrix formulation for the rest of
the chapter.
min cTx + bT yXly
s.t. Fx f, (2.13)
Hy < h, (2.14)
Ax + By < g, (2.15)
Iy = d, (2.16)
x binary.
The binary variable x is a vector of commitment related decision including the on/off
and start-up/shut-down status of each generation unit for each time interval of the
commitment period, usually 24 hours in an ISO setting. The continuous variable y is a
vector of dispatch related decision including the generation output, load consumption
levels, resource reserve levels, and power flows in the transmission network for each
time interval.
The objective function is to mininmize the sum of commitment cost cTx (including
start-up, no-load, and shut-down costs) and dispatch cost bTy over the planning hori-
zon. Constraint (2.13), involving only commitment variables, contains minimum up
and down, and start-up/shut-down constraints. Constraint (2.14) includes dispatch
related constraints such as energy balance (equality can always be written as two
opposite inequalities), reserve requirement, reserve capacity, transmission limit, and
ramping constraints. Constraint (2.15) couples the commitment and dispatch deci-
sions, including minimum and maximum generation capacity constraints. Constraint
(2.16) emphasizes the fact that the uncertain nodal net loads are fixed at expected
values in the deterministic model (J, selects the components from y that correspond
to uncertain resources).
2.3 The Two-stage Fully Adaptive Robust SCUC
Formulation
In this section, we first discuss the uncertainty set, which is a key building block of the
robust model. Then, we introduce the two-stage adaptive robust SCUC formulation
and provide a detailed explanation.
2.3.1 The Uncertainty Set of Net Load
The first step to build a robust model is to construct an uncertainty set. Unlike
the stochastic optimization approach, the uncertainty model in a robust optimization
formulation is not a probability distribution, but rather a deterministic set. In our
model, the uncertain parameter is the nodal net load. We consider the following
uncertainty set of nodal net load at each time period t in the planning horizon T,
Dt(d', dt , A) {dt E R S;dN, (2.17)
it {dt d d + ] V 11 E A rd}
where dt = (di, i E .Md) is the vector of uncertain net loads at time , dt is the deviation
of the uncertain load from the nominal value Pi, and the interval [J - dt, | + dJ] is
the range of the uncertain d', and the inequality in (2.17) controls the total deviation
of all load from their nominal values at time t. The parameter At is the "budget
of uncertainty", taking values between 0 and Nd. When At = 0, the uncertainty
set is a singleton, i.e. D' = {d}, corresponding to the deterministic case. As At
increases, the size of the uncertainty set Dt enlarges, which implies that larger total
deviation from the expected net load is considered. Therefore, the resulting robust UC
solutions are more conservative and the system is protected against a higher degree of
uncertainty. In particular, when A = Nd, D' equals to the entire hypercube defined
by the intervals for each d' for i E Nd.
More compactly, the uncertainty set can be written as the intersection of a 11 ball
and a l ball.
DA(dt, A) = {dt E RNd :b -'(d' - d)1 A t  t  l t }
where D = diag(di, . . . d)
2.3.2 The Adaptive Robust SCUC Formulation
The two-stage adaptive robust SCUC problem is formulated as follows,
min C Tx + max bTy (d) (2.18)
XY(.)dED)
s.t. Fx < f, x is binary,
Hy(d) < h(d). Vd C D,
Ax + By(d) < g, Vd E D,
J,, y (d) -, d, Vd E D.
where d = (dt, t C T) and D = RT D. The objective function has two parts,
reflecting the two-stage nature of the decision. The first part is the commitment cost.
The second part is the worst case second-stage dispatch cost.
In the adaptive robust model, the commitment decision x takes into account all
possible realization of future net load in the uncertainty set. Such a UC solution
remains feasible, thus robust, for any realization of the uncertain net load. In com-
parison, the traditional UC solution only guarantees feasibility for a single nominal
net load, whereas the stochastic optimization UC solution only considers a finite set of
preselected scenarios of the uncertain net load. Furthermore, in our formulation the
optimal second-stage decision y(d) is a function of the uncertain net load d, therefore,
fully adaptive to any realization of the uncertainty. The functional form of y(.) is de-
termined implicitly by the optimization problem, rather than being presumed. This
full adaptability models the economic dispatch procedure in the real-time operation.
The above formulation can be recast in the following equivalent form, which is
easier to see the structure of the two-stage robust model.
min (cTx +max min bTy (2.19)
dED yEQ(x,d)
s.t. Fx < f, x binary,
where Q(x, d) {y : Hy < h, Ax+ By < g, Iuy = d} is the set of feasible dispatch
solutions for a fixed commitment decision x and nodal net load realization d. The first
stage decision is the unit commitment decision x. For a fixed commitment decision,
the second stage implicitly finds the economic dispatch solution for each realization
of the load, and identifies the worst case load that results in the maximum dispatch
cost.
It is useful to write out the dual of the dispatch problem minyeQ(xd) bTy. Denote
its cost by S(x, d).
S(x, d) = max AT (Ax - g) - OTh + lT d (2.20)
- AT B - PTH + I = bT,
p 0, A > 0, 7 free
where p, A and q are the multipliers of the constraints (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16),
respectively.
Now, the second-stage problem maxdED iminyEQ(xd) b Ty is equivalent to a bilinear
optimization problem given below
R(x) = max AT(Ax - g) - pTh + T d (2.21)
d,cp.A,r
- ATB - OTH + ITI, = bT,
d E- E)
p > 0, A > 0, q free.
The uncertainty set D is assumed to be polyhedral. Computing R(x) is non-trivial.
To see this, notice that the objective function of (2.21) contains a non-concave bilinear
term rTd, and bilinear programs are in general NP-hard to solve. Also notice that
the objective function optimized over (p, A, y) results in a convex piece-wise linear
function in d (the pieces are not given explicitly), and maximization over such a
convex function is NP-hard. Throughout this chapter, we assume R(x) < +00 for all
feasible x. This can be ensured by adding penalty terms in the dispatch constraints.
We omit the penalty terms here for a clearer presentation.
2.4 Solution Method to Solve the Adaptive Ro-
bust Model
As analyzed in the previous section, the adaptive robust formulation (2.19) is a two-
stage problem. The first-stage is to find an optimal commitment decision x. The
second-stage is to find the worst-case dispatch cost under a fixed commitment solution.
Therefore, we naturally have a two-level algorithm. The outer level employs a Benders
decomposition (BD) type cutting plane algorithm to obtain x using the information
(i.e. cuts) generated from the inner level, which solves the bilinear optimization
problem (2.21).
2.4.1 The Outer Level: Benders Decomposition Algorithm
The Benders decomposition algorithm is described below.
Initialization: Let x0 be a feasible first-stage solution. Solve R(xo) defined by
(2.21) to get an initial solution (di, pi, A1 , r1). Set the outer level lower bound
LBD = -oo, upper bound UD = +oo and the number of iteration k = 1. Choose
an outer level convergence tolerance level E(> 0).
Iteration k > 1:
Step 1: Solve BD master problem.
The master problem of BD is the following mixed integer program (MIP):
min cT X+0 a(2.22)
s.t. Of > AT(Ax - g) - pfh + TIdi, Vl < k,
Fx < f,x binary.
Let (Xk, ak) be the optimum. Set LBD - CTXk + ak-
Step 2: Solve BD subproblem R(Xk).
We will discuss the methodology to solve R(xk) in the next subsection. Let
(dk+l, Wk+l, Ak+1l I1k+1) be the optimal solution. Set UBD _ CTXk + R(xk)-
Step 3: Check the outer level convergence.
If UBD - L BD < E, stop and return Xk- Otherwise, let k = k + 1, and go to step
1.
To speed up the convergence of the above BD algorithm, we find it helpful to add
dispatch constraints Q(Xk, dk) to the BD master problem (2.22) at certain iteration
k when UBD or LBD has improved slowly.
2.4.2 The Inner Level: Solve R(x)
An outer approximation (OA) algorithm [32, 37] is used to solve the bilinear program
(2.21). Since the problem (2.21) is nonconcave, only a local optimum is guaranteed
by the OA algorithm. To verify the quality of the solution, we test on different initial
conditions and observe fast convergence and consistent results. The OA algorithm is
described below.
Initialization: Fix the unit conmitment decision zk passed from the kth iteration
of the outer level BD algorithm. Find an initial net load di E D. Set the inner level
lower bound L^ = -oc, upper bound UA = +oc and number of iteration j = 1.
Choose an inner level convergence tolerance level 6(> 0).
Iteration j > 1:
Step 1: Solve OA subproblem S(xk, dj).
Solve S(xk, dj), the dual of the dispatch problem defined by (2.20). Let (pW, Aj, 77)
be the optimal solution. Set LOA = S(xk, dj). Define Lj(dj, ?)), the lineariza-
tion of the bilinear term q'd with respect to (dj, vi), as follows
Lj(dj, mj) = n'dj + (y - rjj )'d + (d - d j)inr.
Step 2: Solve OA master problem.
Solve the linearized version of R(xk), defined below:
U (djr) = 'max AT(Ax - g) - pTh+#
< Li(di, rij), Vi 1.j
- ATB - 'pTH + -I = bT,
d E D,
'p > 0, A > 0, ri free.
Since the uncertainty set D is assumed to be polyhedral, U(dj, rm) is a linear
program. Denote (dj±1 , P , 17Agi , #j±1) as the optimal solution. Set the
inner level upper bound as UQA = U(dj, rj).
Step 3: Check the inner level convergence. If UOA - LOA < 6, then stop and
output the current solution. Otherwise, set j = j + 1, go to Step 1 of the OA
algorithm.
The overall algorithmic framework is summarized in Fig. 2-1. In our implemen-
tation, we include all contingency transmission constraints in the BD subproblem.
However, we could also use simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) procedure to generate
transmission security constraints on the fly.
BD Master Problem
BD Subproblem
Outer Approximation
OASubproblem
OA Master
Problem
SFT
Figure 2-1: Flow chart of the proposed two-level algorithm.
2.5 Computational Experiments
In this section, we present a computational study to evaluate the performance of
the adaptive robust (AdaptRob) approach and the reserve adjustment (ResAdj) ap-
proach. We test on the power system operated by the ISO New England Inc. (ISO-
NE). We have the following data and uncertainty model.
The system and market data: The system has 312 generating units, 174 loads,
and 2816 nodes. We select four representative transmission lines that interconnect
four major load zones in the ISO-NE's system. The market data is taken from a
normal winter clay of the ISO-NE's day-ahead energy market. In particular, we have
24-hour data of generators' offer curves, reserve offers, expected nodal load, system
reserve requirement (10-min spinning reserve, 10-min non-spinning reserve, and 30-
min reserve), and various network parameters. The average total generation capacity
per hour is 31,400 MW and the average forecasted load per hour is 14,136 MW.
The uncertainty model: We use the budgeted uncertainty set defined in (2.17), in
which j is the nominal load given in the data. We set the range of load variation to
be d. = 0.1d' for each load j at time t. The budget of uncertainty At takes values33
in the entire range of 0 to Nd. We will discuss the proper way to choose A' within
this range that results in the best performance of the robust solution in the following
subsection.
For the ResAdj approach, we solve the deterministic UC problems presented in
Section II at the expected load level with adjusted reserve requirement. In particular,
we model the reserve adjustment as follows,
At Ndj, = q t + Nd S
Si=1
where q3 t is the system reserve requirement of type j at time t, composed of the basic
reserve level g0,t and an adjustment part proportional to the total variation of load.
Here, the uncertainty budget At also controls the level of conservatism of the ResAdj
solution.
The computational experiments proceed as follows.
1. Obtain UC solutions: Solve the ResAdj and AdaptfRob UC models respectively
for different uncertainty budgets: At E [0, A].
2. Dispatch simulation: For each UC solution, solve the dispatch problem repeat-
edly for two sets of randomly generated loads, each of which has 1000 samples.
One set of randomly sampled load follows a uniform distribution in the interval
[dj - d§. d' + dj] for each load j at time t. The other set follows a normal distribution
with mean e? and standard deviation d'/1.44, which results in an 85 percentile of
load falling between [d. - d., d' + dj] (the load is truncated for nonnegative values).
Notice that samples from both sets may fall outside of the budgeted uncertainty set,
especially when the budget A' is close to 0. In this way, we can test the robustness
of our model in the situation where the uncertainty model is not entirely accurate.
To mimic the high cost of dispatching fast-start units or load shedding in the
real-time operation, we introduce a slack variable z for energy balance, reserve re-
quirement, and transmission constraints in the dispatch simulation. If the real-time
dispatch incurs any energy deficiency, reserve shortage, or transmission violation, at
least one component of z will be positive. The dispatch cost is the sum of produc-
tion cost and penalty cost, i.e. cTp + rTz, where ii is set to $5000/MWh for each
component.
The proposed two-level algorithm for the two-stage adaptive robust model is im-
plemented in GAMS. The mixed integer program and linear program in the algorithm
are solved with CPLEX 12.1.0 on a PC laptop with an Intel Core(TM) 2Duo 2.50GHz
CPU and 3GB memory. We set the convergence tolerance for the outer level BD al-
gorithm to be c = 10-, and the convergence tolerance for the inner level algorithm
to be 6 = 10- . The MIP gap for the BD master problem is set to 10-. The average
computation time to solve the robust UC problem is 6.14 hours. The average com-
putation time for the reserve adjustment approach is 1.65 hours. The computational
results presented in the following subsections use the above tolerance levels and MIP
gap. If we relax the BD convergence tolerance c to 10-3 and the MIP gap of the
BD master problem to 10-3, the average computation time to solve the robust UC
problem decreases to 1.46 hours with an average of 0.17% increase in terms of the
worst-case total cost, which shows there may be enough room for a fined tuning of
the algorithm paramters to improve the computational time without satisfying too
much on solution accuracy.
We compare the performance of the reserve adjustment approach and the adaptive
robust approach in three aspects: (1) The average dispatch and total costs, (2) the
volatility of these costs, and (3) the sensitivity of the these costs to different prob-
ability distributions of the uncertain load. The average cost indicates the economic
efficiency of the UC decision; the volatility of these costs indicates the reliability of
the real-time dispatch operation under the UC decision; the third aspect indicates
how robust the UC decision is against load probability distributions.
The main conclusion is that (a) by properly adjusting the budget level of the
uncertainty set, the adaptive robust solution has lower average dispatch and total
costs, indicating better economic efficiency of the robust approach; (b) the adaptive
robust solution significantly reduces the volatility of the total costs, as well as the
penalty cost in the dispatch operation; (c) the adaptive robust solution is significantly
more robust to different probability distributions of load.
We want to remark that (a) is quite contrary to the general impression that the
robust solution is always overconservative. In fact, by choosing a proper uncertainty
model, the robust solution achieves better economic efficiency than the conventional
approach. We will present detailed discussion later. The computational results for
normally and uniformly distributed loads are similar in illustrating (a) and (b). We
only present the results for normally distributed loads. For (c), we compare the results
of the two distributions.
2.5.1 Cost Efficiency and the Choice of the Budget Level
Table 2.5.1 reports the average dispatch costs and total costs of AdptRob and ResAdj
solutions for normally distributed load when the uncertainty budget At varies from
0 to Nd. We can see that the AdptRob has lower average dispatch costs for all values
of A'. The average total costs of the two approaches are more comparable.
To quantify the comparison, we define the cost saving as
cost saving = (ResAdj cost - AdptRob cost)/(ResAdj cost).
For the normally distributed load, the AdptR ob approach always has lower average
dispatch cost than the ResAdj approach, and can save up to 2.7% or $472k (at
A OJN). which is a significant saving for a daily operation. The total cost
saving of the AdptRob approach ranges from -0.84% (at A = 0.4N) to 1.19% (at
A = 0.1N(!). Since the AdptRob approach protects the system against the worst-case
load realization, in general it commits more generation resources than the reserve
adjustment approach, which only plans for the expected load.
For both average dispatch and total costs, we observe that the robust solution
performs best when the budget level At is relatively small, e.g. around 0.1NA. This
AdptRob ResAdj
budget dispatch cost total cost dispatch cost total cost
A t/Nd (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$)
0.0 19.3530 20.8503 19.3530 20.8503
0.1 16.9852 18.7290 17.4581 18.9547
0.2 17.0513 18.8265 17.2391 18.7400
0.3 17.0949 18.8773 17.2563 18.7595
0.4 17.1448 18.9425 17.2570 18.7843
0.5 17.1583 18.9569 17.2893 18.8250
0.6 17.1705 18.9723 17.3030 18.8506
0.7 17.1719 18.9896 17.3537 18.9062
0.8 17.1715 18.9892 17.3899 18.9472
0.9 17.1655 18.9898 17.3990 18.9669
1.0 17.1652 18.9894 17.4524 19.0660
Table 2.1: The average dispatch costs and total costs of the AdptRob and ResAdj for
normally distributed load for A t/Nd = 0, 0.1.... ,1.
phenomenon can be explained by the probability law, namely the central limit the-
orem. When a large number Nd of random loads (independent as we assume) are
aggregated. the volatility of the total load scales according to V/Nd. Therefore, a
proper level of uncertainty budget in the uncertainty set (2.17) should be chosen as
At ~ O( /Nd). Table 2.5.1 shows the results for At in 0.51Nd to 3/INd, equivalently
At equals 0.038Nd to 0.227Nd, for Nd = 174 in our system. We can see that, in this
range of the uncertainty budget, the AdptRob has an even higher saving: the aver-
age dispatch cost saving from 1.86% or $321.2k (at A = 1.5 /Nd) to 6.96% or $1.27
Million (at A = 0.5 Nd), and the average total cost saving from 0.34% or $64.1k (at
A = 1.5 Nd) to 5.48% or $1.08 Million (at A = 0.5/Nd). This demonstrates that
the probability law provides a proper guideline for choosing the best budget level.
2.5.2 Reliability of Dispatch Operation
The adaptive robust approach significantly reduces the volatility of the real-time
dispatch costs. Table 2.5.2 shows the standard deviation (std) of the dispatch costs
of the two approaches, and their ratios (ResAdj/AdptRob) for normally distributed
load. We can see that the std for the reserve adjustment approach is almost an order of
AdptRob ResAdj
budget dispatch cost total cost dispatch cost total cost
At/ Nd (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$)
0.5 16.9195 18.6050 18.1855 19.6837
1.0 16.9650 18.6688 17.4907 18.9942
1.5 16.9815 18.7365 17.3027 18.8006
2.0 17.0297 18.7937 17.7403 19.2415
2.5 17.0586 18.8366 17.6567 19.1618
3.0 17.0745 18.8526 18.0804 19.5889
Table 2.2: The average dispatch costs and total costs of the AdptRob and ResAdj for
normally distributed load At/ Nd = 0.5, 1, ... , 3.
magnitude higher than that for the adaptive robust approach (8.15-14.48 times). The
significant reduction in the std of the dispatch cost is closely related to the reduction
in the penalty cost. Table 2.5.2 shows the penalty costs of the two approaches.
Recall that the dispatch cost is the sum of the production cost and penalty cost.
The penalty cost occurs whenever there is a violation in the energy balance, reserve
requirement, or transmission constraints. The system operator has to take expensive
emergency actions such as dispatching fast-start units or load-shedding to maintain
system reliability. All these actions add volatility to the dispatch costs.
AdptRob ResAdj ResAdj
budget std dispatch std dispatch /
A t /N cost (k$) cost (k$) AdptR.ob
0.0 1,769.5107 1.769.5107 1
0.1 47.4900 687.5098 14.48
0.2 46.3647 687.5098 8.62
0.3 45.4248 377.7901 8.32
0.4 44.2397 366.7359 8.29
0.5 44.1075 377.1875 8.55
0.6 43.9936 370.8673 8.43
0.7 43.9263 377.0631 8.58
0.8 43.9338 370.7203 8.44
0.9 43.9023 357.9338 8.15
1.0 43.9431 361.0376 8.22
Table 2.3: Standard deviation of the dispatch costs of
ratio for normally distributed load.
the two approaches and their
AdptRob ResAdj
budget penalty penalty percent of
At/Nd cost (k$) cost (k$) disp. cost
0.0 2377.62 2,377.6237 12.29%
0.1 0 497.8243 2.85%
0.2 0 272.4362 1.58%
0.3 0 268.0298 1.55%
0.4 0 252.3463 1.46%
0.5 0 267.6559 1.55%
0.6 0 259.7954 1.50%
0.7 0 267.6559 1.54%
0.8 0 259.7954 1.49%
0.9 0 241.6133 1.39%
1.0 0 247.4119 1.42%
Table 2.4: Penalty costs of
load.
AdptRob and ResAdj approaches for normally distributed
As we observe, all three types of constraint violations (enery, reserve, and trans-
mission) may occur for ResAdj solutions, indicating the potential ineffectiveness of
a deterministic approach that only considers nominal load and system level reserves.
In contrast, the AdptRob approach commits resources by taking consideration of
all load realizations in the uncertainty model, as well as the transmission network.
Furthermore, the robust solutions remain feasible even when the load realization is
outside of the uncertainty set (as the case for normally distributed load).
In conclusion, the low volatility of the dispatch cost and the zero penalty cost of
the adaptive robust approach demonstrates its operational effectiveness in reducing
costly emergency actions and improving system reliability
2.5.3 Robustness Against Load Distributions
In practice, it is a non-trivial job to accurately identify the probability distribution of
the load uncertainty for each node, especially in a large-scale power system. Thus, it
is important for a UC solution to have stable economic and operational performance
over different distributions of the uncertain load. The simulation results show that
the adaptive robust approach exhibits such desirable property. In comparison, the
performance of the reserve adjustment approach can be significantly affected by the
underlying probability distribution.
As shown in Fig. 2-2, the average dispatch costs of the AdptRob approach are
almost the same for loads with normal and uniform distributions. The absolute
difference between the two curves is between $6.32k and $15.80k for the entire range of
A = O.1Nd,..., 0.9Nd. The relative difference is between 0.037% to 0.092% (defined
as (normal cost-uniform cost)/normal cost).
The ResAdj approach has a rather different picture, as shown in Fig. 2-3. The
average dispatch costs are significantly affected by the load probability distribution.
The absolute difference of the two curves varies between $174.42k and $382.26k. The
relative difference is between 1.0% to 2.2%. In both measures, the difference is more
than 20 times larger than that of the AdptRob approach.
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Figure 2-2: The average dispatch costs of the AdptRob approach for normally and
uniformly distributed load.
We also study the effect of the load distribution on the standard deviation of
dispatch costs. Table 2.5.3 shows the std of dispatch costs for loads with uniform
distribution and the relative difference between the uniform distribution and the
normal distribution (defined as (normal std - uniforim std)/norinal std, c.f. Table 2.5.2
for normal std). As shown in the table, the relative change of the std is around 18.8%
for the AdptRob approach, and is around 59.6% for the ResAdj approach, which is
more than three times higher. It is also interesting to note that the AdptRob approach
significantly reduces the relative change of the std comparing to the deterministic
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Figure 2-3: The average dispatch costs of the ResAdj approach for normally and
uniformly distributed load.
approach (A = 0) from 64.70% to around 18.8%. On the other hand, the ResAdj
approach is much less effective in this respect (from 64.70% to around 59.6%).
AdptRob ResAdj
budget std. disp. Relat. std. disp. relat.
At /NA7  cost (k$) diff cost (k$) diff
0.0 624.5939 64.70% 624.5939 64.70%
0.1 38.5824 18.76% 227.7822 66.87%
0.2 37.6948 18.70% 153.5149 61.61%
0.3 36.8956 18.78% 157.0428 58.43%
0.4 36.2507 18.06% 150.7548 58.89%
0.5 35.7960 18.84% 156.9203 58.40%
0.6 35.6687 18.92% 154.4555 58.35%
0.7 35.6179 18.91% 156.8091 58.41%
0.8 35.6067 18.95% 154.3305 58.37%
0.9 35.5761 18.97% 148.2292 58.59%
1.0 35.6092 18.97% 151.8466 57.94%
Table 2.5: Standard deviation of dispatch costs for uniformly distributed load and
the relative difference with those of the normally distributed load.
2.6 Conclusion
The adaptive robust model and its solution technique presented in this chapter pro-
vide a novel and practical approach to handle uncertainties in the unit commitment
process. Such a framework naturally fits into the daily reliability unit commitment
process in an ISO environment. We develop a practical solution method with the
goal for the method to be applicable in the real-world large scale power system oper-
ation. We conduct extensive tests on the large scale system operated by the ISO New
England, and compare our model with the current reserve adjustment approach. We
find that by properly setting the level of conservatism in the uncertainty model, the
adaptive robust model exhibits sizable savings on both average dispatch and total
costs, and significantly reduces the volatility of the dispatch cost, thus, improves the
real-time reliability of the power system operation. The robust model also shows
resilient performance under different probability distributions of load.
Some discussions are in order. The stochastic factors that influence the unit com-
mitment problem are associated with both supply (e.g. wind power, etc.) and demand
(e.g. demand forecast errors, price responsive demand, etc.) To address these vari-
ous uncertainty elements, the proposed two-stage adaptive robust framework models
the uncertainty at the individual nodal level. Therefore, the impact of resource level
uncertainty on the transmission system can be evaluated. -Moreover, the proposed
model can be readily extended to include uncertainties related to inter-tie exchanges,
system-wide and zonal level load, and interface limit de-rating.
In our model, we assume that the commitment cost function and the dispatch
cost function are both linear. In reality, the production cost could be a quadratic
function, the start-up cost could follow an exponential function, and the shut-down
cost could be a step function. The nonlinearity in the corresponding cost functions
can be modeled by the mixed-integer linear reformulation proposed in [28].
Our work focuses on polylhe(lral uncertainty sets. However, the model can be
extended to include general convex uncertainty sets, such as ellipsoidal uncertainty
sets. The framework of the proposed solution methodology, especially the outer
approximation technique to solve the second-stage problem, can be generalized to
handle nonlinear convex constraints.
In the current practice, the SFT runs iteratively with the unit commitment proce-
dure by gradually adding violated transmission security constraints to the economic
dispatch problem. Alternatively, as we implemented in our numerical test, we can
impose a set of critical transmission security constraints in the second-stage problem
without running the SFT. These critical transmission security constraints are more
likely to be violated than other constraints based on the expert knowledge and his-
torical data, and they are usually a small subset of the total transmission constraints.
Therefore, this alternative approach can reduce the computation time for solving the
second-stage problem.
Chapter 3
A Geometric Characterization of
the Power of Finite Adaptability in
Multistage Stochastic and
Adaptive Optimization
3.1 Introduction
In most real world problems, several parameters are uncertain at the optimization
phase and decisions are required to be made in the face of these uncertainties. De-
terministic optimization is often not useful for such problems as solutions obtained
through such an approach might be sensitive to even small perturbations in the
problem parameters. Stochastic optimization was introduced by Dantzig [31] and
Beale [3), and since then has been extensively studied in the literature. A stochastic
optimization approach assumes a probability distribution over the uncertain parame-
ters and seeks to optimize the expected value of the objective function typically. We
refer the reader to several textbooks including Infanger [51], Kall and Wallace [55],
Pr6kopa [69], Shapiro [75], Shapiro et al. [76] and the references therein for a com-
prehensive review of stochastic optimization.
While the stochastic optimization approach has its merits and there has been
reasonable progress in the field, there are two significant drawbacks of the approach.
1. In a typical application, only historical data is available rather than probabil-
ity distributions. Modeling uncertainty using a probability distribution is a
choice we make, and it is not a primitive quantity fundamentally linked to the
application.
2. More importantly, the stochastic optimization approach is by and large com-
putationally intractable. Shapiro and Nemirovski [77] give hardness results for
two-stage and multi-stage stochastic optimization problems where they show the
multi-stage stochastic optimization is computationally intractable even if ap-
proximate solutions are desired. Dyer and Stougie [33] show that a multi-stage
stochastic optimization problem where the distribution of uncertain parameters
in any stage also depends on the decisions in past stages is PSPACE-hard.
To solve a two-stage stochastic optimization problem, Shapiro and Nemirovski [77]
show that a sampling based algorithm provides approximate solutions given that a
sufficiently large number of scenarios are sampled from the assumed distribution and
the problem has a relatively complete recourse. A two-stage stochastic optimization
problem is said to have a relatively complete recourse if for every first stage decision
there is a feasible second stage recourse solution almost everywhere, i.e., with prob-
ability one (see the book by Shapiro et al. [76]). Shmoys and Swamy [78, 81] and
Gupta et al. [46, 47] consider the two-stage and multi-stage stochastic set covering
problem under certain restrictions on the objective coefficients, and propose sampling
based algorithms that use a small number of scenario samples to construct a good
first-stage decision. However, the stochastic set covering problem admits a complete
recourse, i.e., for any first-stage decision there is a feasible recourse decision in each
scenario, and the sampling based algorithms only work for problems with complete
or relatively complete recourse.
More recently, the robust optimization approach has been considered to address
optimization under uncertainty and has been studied extensively (see Ben-Tal and
Nemirovski [11, 12, 14], El Ghaoui and Lebret [34], Goldfarb and Iyengar [42], Bert-
simas and Sim [21], Bertsimas and Sim [22]). In a robust optimization approach, the
uncertain parameters are assumed to belong to some uncertainty set and the goal is
to construct a single (static) solution that is feasible for all possible realizations of
the uncertain parameters from the set and optimizes the worst-case objective. We
point the reader to the survey by Bertsimas et al. [15] and the book by Ben-Tal et
al. [9] and the references therein for an extensive review of the literature in robust
optimization. This approach is significantly more tractable as compared to a stochas-
tic optimization approach and the robust problem is equivalent to the corresponding
deterministic problem in computational complexity for a large class of problems and
uncertainty sets [15]. However, the robust optimization approach has the following
drawbacks. Since it optimizes over the worst-case realization of the uncertain param-
eters, it may produce highly conservative solutions that may not perform well in the
expected case. Moreover, the robust approach computes a single (static) solution even
for a multi-stage problem with several stages of decision-making as opposed a fully-
adaptable solution where decisions in each stage depend on the actual realizations of
the parameters in past stages. This may further add to the conservativeness.
Another approach is to consider solutions that are fully-adaptable in each stage
and depend on the realizations of the parameters in past stages and optimize over
the worst case. Such solution approaches have been considered in the literature and
referred to as adjustable robust policies (see Ben-Tal et al. [10] and the book by Ben-
Tal et al. [9] for a detailed discussion of these policies). Unfortunately, the adjustable
robust problem is computationally intractable and Ben-Tal et al. [10] introduce an
affinely adjustable robust solution approach to approximate the adjustable robust
problem. Affine solution approaches (or just affine policies) were introduced in the
context of stochastic programming (see Gartska and Wets [39] and Rockafeller and
Wets [73]) and have been extensively studied in control theory (see the survey by
Beimporad and Morari [6]). Affine policies are useful due to their computational
tractability and strong empirical performance. Recently Bertsimas et al. [20] show
that affine policies are optimal for a single dimension multi-stage problem with box
constraints and box uncertainty sets. Bertsimas and Goyal [18} consider affine policies
for the two-stage adaptive (or adjustable robust) problem and give a tight bound of
O( /dim(U)) on the performance of affine policies with respect to a fully-adaptable
solution where dim(U) denotes the dimension of the uncertainty set.
In this chapter, we consider a class of solutions called finitely adaptable solutions
that were introduced by Bertsimas and Caramanis [16]. In this class of solutions, the
decision-maker apriori computes a small number of solutions instead of just a single
(static) solution such that for every possible realization of the uncertain parameters,
at least one of them is feasible and in each stage, the decision-maker implements the
best solution from the given set of solutions. Therefore, a finitely adaptable solution
policy is a generalization of the static robust solution and is a middle ground between
the static solution policy and the fully-adaptable policy. It can be thought of as a
special case of a piecewise-affine policy where the each piece is a static solution instead
of an affine solution. As compared to a fully-adaptable solution, which prescribes a
solution for all possible scenarios (possibly an uncountable set), a finitely adaptable
solution has only a small finite number of solutions. Therefore, the decision space is
much sparser and it is significantly more tractable than the fully-adaptable solution.
Furthermore, for each possible scenario, at least one of the finitely adaptable solutions
is feasible. This makes it different from sampling based approaches where a small
number of scenarios are sampled and an optimal decision is computed for only the
sampled scenarios, while the rest of the scenarios are ignored. We believe that finitely
adaptable solutions are consistent with how decisions are made in most real world
problems. Unlike dynamic programming that prescribes an optimal decision for each
(possibly uncountable) future state of the world, we make decisions for only a few
states of the world.
We aim to analyze the performance of static robust and finitely adaptable solution
policies for the two-stage and multi-stage stochastic optimization problems, respec-
tively. We show that the performance of these solution approaches as compared to
the optimal fully-adaptable stochastic solution depends on fundamental geometric
properties of the uncertainty set including symmetry for a fairly general class of mod-
els. Bertsimas and Goyal [18] analyze the performance of static robust solution in
two-stage stochastic problems for perfectly symmetric uncertainty sets such as ellip-
soids, and norm-balls. We consider a generalized notion of symmetry of a convex
set introduced in Minkowski [62], where the symmetry of a convex set is a number
between 0 and 1. The symmetry of a set being equal to one implies that it is perfectly
symmetric (such as an ellipsoid). We show that the performance of the static robust
and the finitely adaptable solutions for the corresponding two-stage and multi-stage
stochastic optimization problems depends on the symmetry of the uncertainty set.
This is a two-fold generalization of the results in [18]. We extend the results
in [18] of performance of a static robust solution in two-stage stochastic optimization
problems, for general convex uncertainty sets using a generalized notion of symmetry.
Furthermore, we also generalize the static robust solution policy to a finitely adaptable
solution policy for the multi-stage stochastic optimization problem and give a similar
bound on its performance that is related to the symmetry of the uncertainty sets. The
results are quite general and extend to important cases such as integrality constraints
on decision variables and linear conic inequalities. To the best of our knowledge, there
were no approximation bounds for the multi-stage problemn in such generality.
3.2 Models and Preliminaries
In this section, we first setup the models for two-stage and multi-stage stochastic,
robust, and adaptive optimization problems. We also discuss the solution concept
of finitely adaptability for multi-stage problems. Then we introduce the geometric
quantity of symmetry of a convex compact set and some properties that will be used.
Lastly, we define a quantity called translation factor of a convex set.
3.2.1 Two-stage Optimization Models
A two-stage stochastic optimization problem, H2toch, is defined as,
ZStoch := Min cTx + E,[dTy(b)) (3.1)
x,y(b)
s.t. Ax + By(b) > b, p-a.e. b E U C R',
x E RPI x R" P+
y(b) E RP2 x R P2 Vb E U.
Here, the first-stage decision variable is denoted as x; the second-stage decision
variable is y(b) for b E U, where b is the uncertain right-hand side with the uncertainty
set denoted as U. The optimization in (3.1) for the second stage decisions y(.) is
performed over the space of piecewise affine functions, since there are finitely many
bases of the system of linear inequalities Ax + By(b) > b. Note that some of the
decision variables in both the first and second stage are free, i.e., not constrained to
be non-negative. A probability measure p is defined on U. Both A and B are certain,
and there is no restriction on the coefficients in A, B or on the objective coefficients
c, d. The linear constraints Ax + By(b) > b hold for p almost everywhere on U, i.e..
the set of b E U for which the linear constraints are not satisfied has measure zero.
We use the notation p-a.e. b E U to denote this.
The key assumption in the above problem is that the uncertainty set U is con-
tained in the nonnegative orthant. In addition, we make the following two technical
assumptions.
1. Zst 0c is finite. This assumption implies that zstoch > 0. Since if Zstoch < 0, then
it must be unbounded from below as we can scale the solution by an arbitrary
positive factor and still get a feasible solution.
2. For any first-stage solution x, and a second-stage solution y(-) that is feasible
for I almost everywhere on U, E,[y(b)] exists.
These technical conditions are assumed to hold for all the multi-stage stochastic
models considered in the chapter as well. We would like to note that since A is not
necessarily equal to B, our model does not admit relatively complete recourse.
A two-stage adaptive optimization problem, "Adapt, is given as,
ZAdapt :min
x,y(b)
s.t.
Note that the above problem is
the literature (see Ben-Tal et al.
c x + max dTy(b)
bEU
Ax + By(b) > b, Vb E U C Rm,
x E RPI x Rnl P1,
y(b) E RP2 x Rn +2, Vb E U.
(3.2)
also referred to as an adjustable robust problem in
[10] and the book by Ben-Tal et al. [9]).
The corresponding static robust optimization problem, URob, is defined as,
ZRob :=mm Tx + dTy
xy
s.t. Ax + By > b, Vb E U C Rn,
x E RP1 x R" -"
y E RP2 x Rn2P2
(3.3)
Note that any feasible solution to the robust problem (3.3) is also feasible for the
adaptive problem (3.2), and thus ZAdapt ZRob. Moreover, any feasible solution to
the adaptive problem (3.2) is also feasible for the stochastic problem (3.1) and in
addition, we have
c Tx + Ep[dTy(b)] < cTx + nax d'y(b),
bEU
leading to ZStocIh < ZAdapt. Hence, we have zstoc, ZAdapt < ZRob.
We would like to note that when the left hand side of the constraints, i.e., A and
B are uncertain, even a two-stage, two-dimensional problem can have an unbounded
gap between the static robust solution and the stochastic solution.
3.2.2 Multi-stage Optimization Models
For multi-stage problems, we consider a fairly general model where the evolution
of the multi-stage uncertainty is given by a directed acyclic network G = (A, A),
where /V is the set of nodes corresponding to different uncertainty sets, and A is
the set of arcs that describe the evolution of uncertainty from Stage k to (k + 1)
for all k = 2, ... , K - 1. In each Stage (k + 1) for k = 1, ... ,K - 1, the uncertain
parameters Uk belong to one of the Nk uncertainty sets, "k C.., /,clR'. We also
assume that the probability distribution of Uk conditioned on the fact that Uk E j for
all k =2,. . . , K, j 1,.. . , Nk is known. In our notation, the multi-stage uncertainty
network starts from Stage 2 (and not Stage 1) and we refer to the uncertainty sets
and uncertain parameters in Stage (k + 1) using index k. Therefore, in a K-stage
problem, the index k E {1, ... , K - 1}.
In Stage 2, there is a single node UI, which we refer to as the root node. Therefore,
N 1 = 1. For any k = 1, ... , K - 1, suppose the uncertain parameters Uk in Stage
(k + 1), belongs to UI for some j =1, . Nk. Then for any edge from i to , in
the directed network, Uk+1 E.., with probability p, which is an observable event
in Stage (k+ 2). In other words, in Stage (k+ 2), we can observe which state transition
happened in stage (k + 1). Therefore, at every stage, we know the realizations of the
uncertain parameters in past stages as well as the path of the uncertainty evolution
in G and the decisions in each stage depend on both of these. Note that since we
also observe the path of the uncertainty evolution (i.e. what edges in the directed
network were realized in each stage), the uncertainty sets in a given stage need not
be disjoint. This model of uncertainty is a generalization of the scenario tree model
often used in stochastic programming (see Shapiro et al. [76]) where the multi-stage
uncertainty is described by a tree. If the directed acyclic network G in our model is
a tree and each uncertainty set is a singleton, our model reduces to a scenario tree
model described in [76].
The evolution of the multi-stage uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 3-1. We would
like to note that this is a very general model of multi-stage uncertainty. For instance,
consider a multi-period inventory management problem, where the demand is uncer-
tain. In each stage, we observe the realized demand and also a signal from the market
about the next period demand such as the weekly retail sales index. In our model, the
observed market signals correspond to the path in the multi-stage uncertainty net-
work and the observed demand is the actual realization of the uncertain parameters.
As another example, consider a multi-period asset management problem with uncer-
tain asset returns. In each period, we observe the asset returns and also a market
signal such as S&P 500 or NASDAQ indices. Again, the market signals correspond
to the path in the multi-stage uncertainty network in our model and observed asset
returns are the realization of uncertain parameters in the model.
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Figure 3-1: Illustration of the evolution of uncertainty in a multi-stage problem.
Let P denote the set of directed paths in G from the root node, U', to node
U for all j 1,..., NK-1. We denote any path P E P as an ordered sequence.
(ji,... jK-1) of the indices of the uncertainty sets in each stage that occur on P.
Let Q(P) denote the set of possible realizations of the multi-stage uncertainty from
uncertainty sets in P. For any P = (ji ... ,j..).E P,
(P) {w (bi,..., bK) bk EU , Vk= 1,...,K- 1} . (3.4)
For any P (ji. jKl) E P, and k = 1. .. . K - 1, let Pk] denote the index
sequence of Path P from Stage 2 to Stage (k + 1), i.e., P[k] = (ji,. .. ,j). Let
P[k] {P[k] I P E P}. Also, for any w = (bi, . . , bK-1) E Q (P), let w[k] denote
the subsequence of first k elements of w, i.e., w[k] = (bi,.. . , bk).
We define a probability measure for the multi-stage uncertainty as follows. For any
k = 1,..., K - 1, j = 1, ... , N, let be a probability measure defined on U that is
independent of the probability measures over other uncertainty sets in the network.
Therefore, for any P = (j1,..., jK-1) E P, the probability measure pp over the set
Q(P) is the product measure of pI, k = 1,.. . , K - 1. Moreover, the probability
that the uncertain parameters realize from path P is given by HI Pk k+1. This
defines a probability measure on the set of realizations of the multi-stage uncertainty,
UPEP Q(P).
We can now formulate the K-stage stochastic optimization problem UKoch, where
the right-hand side of the constraints is uncertain, as follows.
K-1
zSto- in c x + S EE'p (E, [dky k(w [k], P[k])]]
k=1
s.t. VP E P, pp-a.e. w = (bi, . . . , bK- 1) E Q(P)
K-I K-1
Ax + ( Bkyk(w[k], P[k]) > b (3.5)
k=1 k=1
x E RI x Rn, p,+
yk(w[k), P[k]) E RPk x R AnkPk, Vk = 1. K - 1.
There is no restriction on the coefficients in the constraint matrices A, Bk or on
the objective coefficients c, dk, k - 1,...,K - 1. However, we require that each
uncertainty set Uk C R' for all j =. NA, k = 1, K - 1. As mentioned
before, we assume that z och is finite and the expectation of every feasible multi-
stage solution exists.
We also formulate the K-stage adaptive optimization problem UKdapt as follows.
K-1
Zgdapt min c x + max min dk Y, LO[k], P[k)
PEP wEQ(P) yk(w[k],P[k),k=1,...,K-1 k=1
s.t. VP G P, Vw = (bi,... bK-1) E Q(P)
K-1 K-1
Ax + ( Bkyk(w[k], P[k]) ;> E bk,
k=1 k=1
x E RP1 x Rfl-I,
Yk(W[k],P[k])ER XR" , Vk=l,...,K-1.
(3.6)
We also formulate the K-stage stochastic optimization problem TI d whereStoch(b~d)'
both the right-hand side and the objective coefficients are uncertain, as follows. The
subscript Stoch(b, d) in the subscript of the problem name denotes that both the
right hand side b and the objective coefficient d are uncertain. Here, w denotes the
sequence of uncertain right-hand side and objective coefficients realizations and for
any k = 1, . . . , K - 1, w[k] denotes the subsequence of first k elements. Also, for any
P E P, the measure pp is the product measure of the measures on the uncertainty
sets in Path P.
K-1
z 4och(bd) min c x + > EPE [E,, [diyk(w[k], P[k])]
k=1
s.t. VP E P, pp-a.e. w =- ((biI d1), .... , (b _1, dK-) _1Q (P)
K-1 K-1
Ax + ( Bkyk(w[k] , P[k]) > > bk,
k=1 k=1
X E RPI x R
Yk(w[k],P[k]) E REk x R+ PVk= K - 1.
(3.7)
Also, we can formulate the K-stage adaptive problem flAapt(b,d),
K-1
zdapt(b,d) min C TX + max min dk Yk(w [k], P[k])
PEP,wEQ(P) yk(w[k],P[k]),k=,.,K-1 k=1
s.t. VP (E 'P, VW = ((bi, di), . (bK-1, I K-1)) E Q
K K
Ax +( Bkyk(W[k], P[k]) ;> > bk,
k=1 k=1
x E RPI xR Rnfp,
Yk(w[k], P[k]) E RP x R+ " , Vk = 1,..., K - 1.
(3.8)
In Section 3.7, we consider an extension to the case where the constraints are
general linear conic inequalities and the right hand side uncertainty set is a convex
and compact subset of the underlying cone. Furthermore, in Section 3.8, we also con-
sider extensions of the above two-stage and multi-stage models where some decision
variables in each stage are integer.
3.2.3 Examples
In this section, we show two classical problems that can be formulated in our frame-
work to illustrate the applicability of our models.
Multi-period inventory management problem. We show that we can model
the classical multi-period inventory management problem as a special case of (3.5).
In a classical single-item inventory management problem, the goal in each period
is to decide on the quantity of the item to order under an uncertain future period
demand. In each period, each unit of excess inventory incurs a holding cost and each
unit of backlogged demand incurs a per-unit penalty cost and the goal is to make
ordering decisions such that the sum of expected holding and backorder-penalty cost
is minimized.
As an example, we model a 3-stage problem in our framework. Let Q denote the
set of demand scenarios with a probability measure p, x denote the initial inventory,
yk(bi, .. . bk) denote the backlog and Zk(bi, ... bk) denote the order quantity in Stage
(k + 1) when the first k-period demand is (bi,... , bk). Let hk denote the per unit
holding cost and PA denote the per-unit backlog penalty in Stage (k + 1). We model
the 3-stage inventory management problem as follows where the decision variables
are x, y1 (bi), y2 (bi, b2) and zi(bi) for all (bi, b2 ) E U.
Min Eb1 [hi(x + yi(bi) - bi) +piy 1 (bi) + Eb2 1b1 [h2 (x + zi(bi) + y 2(bi,b 2) - (b1 + b2 ))
+ P2Y2 (b1, b2)]1
s.t. x + y1(bi) > bi, p-a.e. (bi, b2 ) E Q
x + zi (bi) +y 2(bi, b2) > b1 + b2 , p-a.e. (bi, b2 ) E Q
x, y1 (bi),y 2 (bi, b2), zi(bi) > 0.
The above formulation can be generalized to a multi-period problem in a straight-
forward manner. We can also generalize to multi-item variants of the problem. How-
ever, we would like to note that we can not model a capacity constraint on the order
quantity. since we require that the constraints are of "greater than or equal to" form
with nonnegative right-hand sides. Nevertheless, the formulation is fairly general even
with this restriction.
Capacity planning under demand uncertainty. In many important applica-
tions, we encounter the problem of planning for capacity to serve an uncertain future
demand. For instance, in a call center, staffing capacity decisions need to be made well
in advance of the realization of the uncertain demand. In electricity grid operations,
generator unit-commitment decisions are required to be made at least a day ahead
of the realization of the uncertain electricity demand because of the large startup
time of the generators. In a facility location problem with uncertain future demand,
the facilities need to be opened well in advance of the realized demand. Therefore,
the capacity planning problem under demand uncertainty is important and widely
applicable.
We show that this can be modeled in our framework using the example of the
facility location problem. For illustration, we use a 2-stage problem. Let F denote
the set of facilities and D denote the set of demand points. For each facility i E _,
let xi be an integer decision variable that denotes the capacity for facility i. For each
point j E D, let bj denote the uncertain future demand and let y23(b) denote the
amount of demand of j assigned to facility i when the demand vector is b. Also,
let dij denote the cost of assigning a unit demand from point j to facility i and let
ci denote the per-unit capacity cost of facility i. Therefore, we can formulate the
problem as follows. Let U be the uncertainty set for the demand and let p be a
probability measure defined on U.
min 3 cix + E Zdijyi(b)
i E j ED
s.t. yi(b) > by, p-a.e. b E U, Vj E E)
x - >Zyij(b) > 0, p-a.e. b E L, Vi T
jED
Xi E Z+. Vi E F
yj (b) E R+, Vi E F, j E D, p-a.e. b E U.
3.2.4 Finitely Adaptable Solutions
We consider a finitely adaptable class of solutions for the multi-stage stochastic and
adaptive optimization problems described above. This class of solutions was intro-
duced by Bertsimas and Caramanis [16] where the decision-maker computes a small
set of solutions in each stage apriori.
A static robust solution policy specifies a single solution that is feasible for all pos-
sible realizations of the uncertain parameters. On the other extreme, a fully-adaptable
solution policy specifies a solution for each possible realization of the uncertain pa-
rameters in past stages. Typically. the set of possible realizations of the uncertain
parameters is uncountable which implies that an optimal fully-adaptable solution pol-
icy is a function from an uncountable set of scenarios to optimal decisions for each
scenario and often suffers from the "curse of dimensionality". A finitely adaptable
solution is a tractable approach that bridges the gap between a static robust solution
and a fully-adaptable solution. In a general finitely adaptable solution policy, instead
of computing an optimal decision for each scenario, we partition the scenarios into a
small number of sets and compute a single solution for each possible set. The parti-
tioning of the set of scenarios is problem specific and is chosen by the decision-maker.
A finitely adaptable solution policy is a special case of a piecewise affine solution
where the solution in each piece is a static solution.
For the multi-stage stochastic and adaptive problems (3.5) and (3.6), we consider
the partition of the set of scenarios based on the realized path in the multi-stage
uncertainty network. In particular, in each Stage (k + 1), the decision Yk depends
on the path of the uncertainty realization until Stage (k + 1). Therefore, there are
IP[k]I different solutions for each Stage (k + 1), k = 1 . . K - 1: one corresponding
to each directed path from the root node to a node in Stage (k + 1) in the multi-stage
uncertainty network. For any realization of uncertain parameters and the path in the
uncertainty network, the solution policy implements the solution corresponding to the
realized path. Figure 3-2 illustrates the number of solutions in the finitely adaptable
solution for each stage and each uncertainty set in a multi-stage uncertainty network.
In the example in Figure 3-2, there are following four directed paths from Stage 2
to Stage K (K = 4): PI = (1, 1, 1), P 2 = (1, 1. 2), P 3 = (1, 2, 2), P 4 = (1, 2,3).
We know that Pj [1] = (1) for all j = 1 . 4. Also, P1[2] = P2[2] = (1, 1) and
P 3 [2] = P4[2] = (1, 2). Therefore, in a finitely adaptable solution, we have the
following decision variables apart from x.
Stage 2 y 1(1)
Stage 3 Y2(1l1),Y2(1. 2 )
Stage 4 : y(l, 1, 1), y3(1, 1,2), y 3 (1, 2,2), y3(1, 2,3).
{ yj(1. 1. 2)7 yj(1. 2. 2)}1
U11f{y2 (1, 2)}1
{1)3(1-. 3)}
Figure 3-2: A finitely adaptable solution for a 4-stage problem. For each uncertainty
set, we specify the set of corresponding solutions in the finitely adaptable solution
policy.
3.2.5 The Symmetry of a Convex Set
Given a nonempty compact convex set U c R" and a point u E U, we define the
symmetry of u with respect to U as follows.
sym(u, U) := max{ca > 0 : u + a(u - u') E U, Vu' E U}. (3.9)
In order to develop a geometric intuition on sym(u, U), we first show the following
result. For this discussion, assume U is full-dimensional.
Lemma 1. Let L be the set of lines in R' passing through u. For any line 1 E L,
let u' and uj' be the points of intersection of I with the boundary of U, denoted 6(U)
(these exist as U is full-dimensional and compact). Then,
a) sym(uU) < (fuin - U7'f fu U'11)
- u' |fu
U| - u'I| | - ||b) sym(u, U) =minmin , -u' .IU )Ie Ef ||Iu - Uu || ||n - U7 |
Proof. Let sym(u, U) = a1. Consider any 1 E E and consider u' E 6(U) as illustrated
in Figure 3-3. Let ujr = u + a1 (u - u). From (3.9), we know that u, E U. Note
that u, is a scaled reflection of u' about u by a factor a1. Furthermore, ul, lies on
{yO(1.I1. 1)}
I. Therefore, n'rE U implies that
|U - U' r ||H -lu'II -> a1 - || - '1 |l| - tj'f,
which in turn implies that
sym(u, U) = ai < Ulu - U'11
Using a similar argument starting with ' instead of u', we obtain that
sym(u, U) < .fU - U11
||n - u '||
To prove the second part, let
- | n n u - u'l ||u - U||)
0/2 = min min EC H 17HU-71let flu - uf||' ||n - u|
From the above argument, we know that sym(uU) < a 2 . Consider any u' E U. We
show that (U + a 2 (U - U')) E U.
Let I denote the line joining u and u'. Clearly, 1 E C. Without loss of generality,
suppose u' belongs to the line segment between u and u'. Therefore, u - u'
-y(u - u') for some 0 < < 1 and
|U - U'Hl ||u - u'll. (3.10)
We know that
a2 < || - 11|
- a2|U - ' fl |U - U''1
- a2|U - U'll < ||U - 'iff,
where the last inequality follows from (3.10). Therefore., u + a2||u - u'| belongs to
the line segment between u and u'4 and thus, belongs to U. Therefore, sym(u, U) ;>
(12 . D
sym(u. U) =i min ' -u.lU- I
U
it
Figure 3-3: Geometric illustration of sym(u, U).
The symmetry of set U is defined as
sym(U) := max{sym(u, U) I u E U}. (3.11)
An optimizer uO of (3.11) is called a point of symmetry of U. This definition of
symmetry can be traced back to Minkowski [62] and is the first and the most widely
used symmetry measure. Refer to Belloni and Freund [5] for a broad investigation of
the properties of the symmetry measure defined in (3.9) and (3.11). Note that the
above definition generalizes the notion of perfect symmetry considered by Bertsimas
and Goyal [18]. In [18], the authors define that a set U is symmetric if there exists
uO E U such that, for any z E R'", (no + z) E U M (uo - z) E U. Equivalently,
u C U 4 (2uo - u) E U. According to the definition in (3.11), sym(U) = 1 for such
a set. Figure 3-4 illustrates symmetries of several interesting convex sets.
Lemma 2 (Belloni and Freund [5]). For any nonempty convex compact set U C R",
the symmetry of U satisfies,
1
-- sym(U) < 1.
m
The symmetry of a convex set is at most 1, which is achieved for a perfectly
symmetric set: and at least 1/mn which is achieved by a standard simplex defined
0
0 syII() = 1 Vs))
Figure 3-4: The figure on the left is a symmetric polytope with symmetry 1. The
middle figure illustrates a standard simplex in R"' with symmetry 1/m. The right
figure shows the intersection of a Euclidean ball with Rm, which has symmetry 1// m.
as A = {x E Rm | E' xi < 1}. The lower bound follows from L6wner-John
Theorem [52] (see Belloni and Freund [5]). The following lemma is used later.
Lemma 3. Let U C R" be a convex and compact set such that uO is the point of
symmetry of U. Then,
1
+ sym(U) u->u7 VuCU.
Proof. From the definition of symmetry in (3.11), we have that for any u E U
uo + sym(U)(Uo 
- U)
which implies that (sym(U) + 1)uo
(sym(U) + 1)uo - sym(U)u E U,
sym(U)u > 0 since U c R".
3.2.6 The Translation Factor p(u, U)
For a convex compact set U C R", we define a translation factor p(u, U), the trans-
lation factor of u E U with respect to U, as follows.
p(u,U) = min{a E R+ I L - (1 - a) - u C
In other words, U' := U - (1 - p)u is the maximum possible translation of U in the
direction -u such that U' C R'. Figure 3-5 gives a geometric picture. Note that for
a = 1, U - (1 - a) - u = U C R'. Therefore, 0 < p < 1. And p approaches 0, when
the set U moves away from the origin. If there exists u E U such that u is at the
boundary of RTn, then p = 1. We denote
p(U) := p(uo,U),
where uO is the symmetry point of the set U. The following lemma is used later in
91'
0
Figure 3-5: Geometry of the translation factor.
the chapter.
Lemma 4. Let U C R' be a convex and compact set such that uO is the point of
symmetry of U. Let s = sym(U) = sym(uo, U) and p = p(U) = p(uo, U). Then.
(1+ Uo > U, Vu E U.
Proof. Let U' = U - (1 - p)uo. Let i1 := uo - (1 - p)uo. Also let z := uo - ui -
(1 - p)uo. Figure 3-5 gives a geometric picture. Note that sym(U') = sym(U) = s.
From Lemma 3, we know that
1+ -Ui n', Vu'E U'.
S
Adding z on both sides, we have,
1+ u +z2 _ Vu EbI,
- 1+ )Puo+(1-P)uo>u, VUEZ-,
-1+0 o U , VuEU.
3.3 Our Contributions
Our contributions are two-fold. We present two significant generalizations of the
model and results in Bertsimas and Goyal [18], where the authors characterize the
performance of static robust solutions for two-stage stochastic and adaptive optimiza-
tion problems under the assumption that the uncertainty sets are perfectly symmetric.
Firstly, we generalize the two-stage results to general uncertainty sets. We show
that the performance of a static robust solution for two-stage stochastic and adaptive
optimization problems depends on the general notion of symmetry (3.11) of the un-
certainty set. The bounds are independent of the constraint matrices and any other
problem data. Our bounds are also tight for all possible values of symmetry and
reduce to the results in [18] for perfectly symmetric sets.
Secondly, we consider the multi-stage extensions of the two-stage models in [18]
as described above and show that a class of finitely adaptable solutions which is a
generalization of the static robust solution, is a good approximation for both the
stochastic and the adaptive problem. The proof techniques are very general and
easily extend to the case where some of the decision variables are integer constrained
and the case where the constraints are linear conic inequalities for a general convex
cone. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first performance bounds for the
multi-stage problem in such generality.
Our main contributions are summarized below.
Stochastic optimization. For the two-stage stochastic optimization problem un-
der right-hand side uncertainty, we show the following bound under a fairly general
condition on the probability measure,
ZRob + i ZStoch,
where s = sym(U) and p = p(U) are the symmetry and the translation factor of
the uncertainty set, respectively. Note that the above bound compares the cost of
an optimal static solution with the expected cost of an optimal fully-adaptable two-
stage stochastic solution and shows that the static cost is at most (1 + p/s) times the
optimal stochastic cost. The performance of the static robust solution for the two-
stage stochastic problem can possibly be even better. For the two-stage problem, we
only implement the first-stage part of the static robust solution. For the second-stage,
we compute an optimal solution after the uncertain parameters (right hand side in
our case) is realized. Therefore, the expected second-stage cost for this solution policy
is at most the second-stage cost of the static robust solution and the total expected
cost is at most ZRob < (1 + p/s) - zStoch . Since ZRob is an upper bound on the expected
cost of the solution obtained from an optimal static solution, the bound obtained by
comparing ZRob to the optimal stochastic cost is in fact a conservative bound.
For multi-stage problems, we show that a K-stage stochastic optimization prob-
lem, stoch , can be well approximated efficiently by a finitely adaptable solution. In
particular, there is a finitely adaptable solution with at most |P| solutions that is a
(1 + p/s)-approximation of the original problem where s is the minimum symmetry
over all sets in the uncertainty network and p is the maximum translation factor of
any uncertainty set. Note that when all sets are perfectly symmetric, i.e., s = 1,
the finitely adaptable solution is a 2-approximation, generalizing the result of [18] to
multi-stage. We also show that the bound of (1 + p/s) is tight.
Note that since 0 < p < 1 and s > 1/m,
(1+ ) <(m+ 1),
which shows that, for a fixed dimension, the performance bound for robust and finitely
adaptable solutions is independent of the particular data of an instance. This is
surprising since when the left-hand side has uncertainty, i.e., A, B are uncertain, even
a two-stage two-dimensional problem can have an unbounded gap between the static
robust solution and the stochastic solution as mentioned earlier. This also indicates
that our assumptions on the model, namely, the right-hand side uncertainty (and/or
cost uncertainty) and the uncertainty set contained in the nonnegative orthant, are
tight. If these assumptions are relaxed, the performance gap becomes unbounded
even for fixed dimensional uncertainty.
For the case when both cost and right-hand side are uncertain in H K the
performance of any finitely adaptable solution can be arbitrarily worse as compared
to the optimal fully-adaptable stochastic solution. This result follows along the lines
of arbitrary bad performance of a static robust solution in two-stage stochastic prob-
lems when both cost and right-hand sides are uncertain as shown in Bertsimas and
Goyal [18].
Adaptive optimization. We show that for a multi-stage adaptive optimization
problem, fat' where only the right-hand side of the constraints is uncertain, the
cost of a finitely adaptable solution is at most (1 + p/s) times the optimal cost of
a fully-adaptable multi-stage solution, where s is the minimum symmetry of all sets
in the uncertainty network and p is the maximum translation factor of the point of
symmetry over all the uncertainty sets. This bound follows from the bound for the
performance of a finitely adaptable solution for the multi-stage stochastic problem.
Furthermore, if the uncertainty comes from hypercube sets, then a finitely adaptable
solution with at most 'PI solutions at each node of the uncertainty network is an
optimal solution for the adaptive problem.
For the case when both cost and right-hand side are uncertain in HK we
show that the worst-case cost a finitely adaptable solution with at most |P different
solutions at each node of the uncertainty network is at most (1 + p/s) 2 times the cost
of an optimal fully-adaptable solution.
Extensions. We consider an extension of the above multi-stage models to the case
where the constraints are linear conic inequalities and the uncertainty set belongs to
the underlying cone. We also consider the case where some of the decision variables
are constrained to be integers. Our proof techniques are quite general and the results
extend to both these cases.
For the case of linear conic inequalities and the uncertainty set contained in the
underlying convex cone, we show that a finitely adaptable (static robust) solution
is a (1 + p/s)-approximation for the multi-stage (two-stage respectively) stochastic
and adaptive problem with right hand side uncertainty. The result also holds for the
adaptive problem with both the right hand side and objective coefficient uncertainty
and the performance bound for the finitely adaptable (static robust) solution is (1 +
p/s) 2 for the multi-stage (two-stage respectively) problem.
We also consider the case where some of the decision variables are integer con-
strained. For the multi-stage (two-stage) stochastic problem with right hand side
uncertainty, if some of the first-stage decision variables are integer constrained, a
finitely adaptable (static robust respectively) solution is a [(1 + p/s)] approximation
with respect to an optimal fully-adaptable solution. For the multi-stage adaptive
problem, we can handle integer constrained decision variables in all stages unlike the
stochastic problem where we can handle integrality constraints only on the first stage
decision variables. We show that for the multi-stage (two-stage) adaptive problem
with right hand side uncertainty and integrality constraints on some of the deci-
sion variables in each stage, a finitely adaptable (static robust respectively) solution
is a [(1 + p/s)-approximnation. For the multi-stage (two-stage) adaptive problem
with both right hand side and objective coefficient uncertainty and integrality con-
straints on variables, a finitely adaptable (static robust respectively) solution is a
[(1 + p/s)] - (1 + p/s)-approximation.
Outline. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.4, we present
the performance bound of a static-robust solution that depends on the symmetry
of the uncertainty set for the two-stage stochastic optimization problem. We also
show that the bound is tight and present explicit bounds for several interesting and
commonly used uncertainty sets. In Section 3.5, we present the finitely adaptable
solution policy for the multi-stage stochastic optimization problem and discuss its
performance bounds. In Section 3.6, we discuss the results for multi-stage adaptive
optimization problems. In Sections 3.7 and 3.8, we present extensions of our results
for the models with linear conic constraints and integrality constraints respectively.
3.4 Two-stage Stochastic Optimization Problem
In this section, we consider the two-stage stochastic optimization problem (3.1) and
show that the performance of a static robust solution depends on the symmetry of
the uncertainty set.
Theorem 1. Consider the two-stage stochastic optimization problem in (3.1). Let
pL be the probability measure on the uncertainty set U C R', bo be the point of
symmetry of U. and p = p(boU) be the translation factor of bo with respect to U.
Denote s = sym(U). Assume the probability measure p satisfies,
E, 1[b] > bo. (3.12)
Then.
zRob (1+ - zstoc. (3.13)
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know that
1 + )bo > b, Vb E U. (3.14)
For brevity, let T := (1 + p/s). Suppose (x, y(b) : b E U) is an optimal fully-
adaptable stochastic solution. We first show that the solution, (TX, TE[y(b)]), is a
feasible solution to the robust problem (3.3). By the feasibility of (x, y(b) p-a.e.
b E- U), we have
A(Tx) + B(Ty(b)) > Tb, p - a.e.b E U.
Taking expectation on both sides, we have
A(Tx)+ B(TE[y(b)]) 2 TE[b] > Tbo > b, Vb E U,
where the second inequality follows from (3.12) and the last inequality follows from (3.14).
Therefore, (TX, TE[y(b)]) is a feasible solution for the robust problem (3.3) and,
ZRob < T - (CTx + dTE[y(b)]). (3.15)
Also, by definition, ZStoch = CT + TlEb[y(b)], which implies that ZStoch r * ZRob
For brevity, we refer to (3.13) as the symmetry bound. The following comments
are in order.
1. The symmetry bound (3.13) is independent of the problem data A, B, c, d,
depending only on the geometric properties of the uncertainty set U, namely
the symmetry and the translation factor of U.
2. Theorem 1 can also be stated in a more general way, removing Assumption
(3.12) on the probability measure, and use the symmetry of the expectation
point. In particular, the bound (3.13) holds for s = sym(E,[b],U) and p =
p(El p[b], U).
However, we would like to note that (3.12) is a mild assumption, especially for
symmetric uncertainty sets. Any symmetric probability measure on a symmetric
uncertainty set satisfies this assumption. It also emphasizes the role that the
symmetry of the uncertainty set plays in the bound.
3. As already mentioned in Section 3.3, a small relaxation from the assumptions
of our model would cause unbounded performance gap. In particular, if the
assumption, U C R', is relaxed, or the constraint coefficients are uncertain,
the gap between ZRob and ZStoch cannot be bounded even in small dimensional
problems. The following examples illustrate this fact.
(a) U Z R": Consider the instance where m = 1 and c = 0, d = 1, A = 0, B
1, the uncertainty set U = [-1, 1], and a uniform distribution on U. The
optimal stochastic solution has cost zStoch(b) = 0, while zRob(b) = 2. Thus,
the gap is unbounded.
(b) A, B uncertain: Consider the following instance taken from Ben-Tal et
al. [9],
nun x
s.t. 2 x + y(b) > ,Vb e [0, r),
1 b -2 0
x, y(b) 2 0, Vb E [0,'r],
where 0 < r < 1. From the constraints, we have that x > 2/(1 - r). There-
fore, the optimal cost of a static solution is at least 2/(1 - r). However,
the optimal stochastic cost is at most 4. For details, refer to [9]. When r
approaches 1, the gap tends to infinity.
3.4.1 Tightness of the Bound
In this section, we show that the bound given in Theorem 1 is tight. In particular,
we show that for any given symmetry and translation factor, there exist a family of
instances of the two-stage stochastic optimization problem such that the bound in
Theorem 1 holds with equality.
Theorem 2. Given any symmetry 1/i < s < 1 and translation factor, 0 < p < 1
there exist a family of instances such that z4ob = (1 + p/s) . zstoch.
Proof. For p > 1, let
B- {b E R 7 IbHj 1}.
77
In Appendix 3.10.1, we show that
sym(B )
and the symmetry point is,
1
bo(B-) = e,
ml 
_/P + 1
where bo(U) denotes the symmetry point for any set U. Also, let (B+)' := B+ + re,
for some r > 0. Then, given any symmetry s > 1/rn and translation factor, p <; 1,
we can find a p> 1 and r > 0 such that
1
P= /P+l)r+l
Now consider a problem instance where A = 0, B = I, c = 0, d e, and a prob-
ability measure whose expectation is at the symmetry point of (B+)'. The optimal
static robust solution is y = (r + 1)e and the optimal stochastic solution is y(b) b
for all b E (BZ)'. Therefore,
Zstoch r +M, ZRob (r + 1)m,
and,
ZRob_ r + 1 p
ZStoch (+i i St
ml /P -1
which shows the bound in Theorem 1 is tight.
3.4.2 An Alternative Bound
In this section, we present another performance bound on the robust solution for the
two-stage stochastic problems, and compare it with the symmetry bound (3.13).
For an uncertainty set U, let bh as b' := maxbEu bj. Also, suppose the probability
measure p satisfies (3.12), i.e., E,[b] > bo, where bo is the symmetry point of U. Let
0* := min{O : 0 - bo > bh}. (3.16)
Using an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that the perfor-
mance gap is at most O*, where the subscript s stands for stochasticity, i.e.,
ZRob < 6 * ZStocII- (3.17)
Let s = sym(bo, U) and p = p(bo, U). From Lemma (4), we also know that
1 + -b> > b, Vb E U.
Therefore, 6* < (1 + p/s). So, O* is upper bounded by the symmetry bound obtained
in Theorem 1. For brevity, we refer to (3.16) as a scaling bound. A geometric picture
is given in Figure 3-6. As shown in the figure, U is obtained from scaling E,,[b] by
a factor greater than one such that U doninates all the points in U, and 0* is the
smallest such factor.
S
0p[b
Figure 3-6: A geometric perspective on the stochasticity gap.
In the following section, we show that the scaling bound can be strictly tighter
than the symmetry bound. On the other hand, the symmetry bound relates the
performance of a static robust solution to key geometric properties of the uncertainty
set. Furthermore, both bounds are equal for several interesting classes of uncertainty
sets as discussed in the following section. In Theorem 2, we show that the symmetry
bound is tight for any p < 1, s > 1/m for a family of uncertainty sets.
The symmetry bound reveals several key qualitative properties of the performance
gap that are difficult to see from the scaling bound. For example, for any symmetric
uncertainty set, without the need to compute bh and O*, we have a general bound of
two on the stochasticity gap. Since symmetry of any convex set is at least 1/m, the
bound for any convex uncertainty set is at most (m + 1). Both these bounds are not
obvious from the scaling bound. Most importantly, in practice the symmetry bound
gives an informative guideline in designing uncertainty sets where the robust solution
has guaranteed performance.
3.4.3 Examples: Stochasticity Gap for Specific Uncertainty
Sets
In this subsection, we give examples of specific uncertainty sets and characterize their
symmetry. Both bounds on the stochasticity gap, the symmetry bound (3.13) as well
the scaling bound (3.16), are presented in Table 3.1 for several interesting uncertainty
sets. In most of the cases, the scaling bound is equal to the symmetry bound. The
proofs of the symnetry computation of various uncertainty sets are deferred to the
Appendix.
An Lu-ball intersected with the nonnegative orthant. We define,
B+: {b E R |||Ibp < 1}
for p > 1. In Appendix 3.10.1 we show the following.
sym(B) = ,bo(B) =-T e. (3.18)
m mi+1
Therefore, if U = B+ and the probability measure satisfies condition (3.12), then
ZRob (1 + m )ZStoch. The bound is tight as shown in Theorem 2. There are several
interesting cases for B+ uncertainty sets. In particular,
1. For p = 1, B is the standard simplex centered at the origin. The symmetry is
1/n and stochasticity gap is m + 1.
2. For p = 2, B+ is the Euclidean ball in the nonnegative orthant. Its symmetry
is 1/vm, and the stochasticity gap is 1 + v/nm.
3. For p =0, B+ is a hypercube centered at e/2 and touches the origin. The
symmetry is 1 and the stochasticity gap is 2.
Ellipsoidal uncertainty set. An ellipsoidal uncertainty set is defined as,
U := {b c R I ||E(b - b)11 2 < 1}, (3.19)
where E is an invertible matrix. Since U is symmetric, the stochasticity gap is
bounded by 2 if U C R7 and the probability measure satisfies (3.12). In Ap-
pendix 3.10.1, we show that the bound can be improved to the following.
ZRob 1 + max E- ZStoch 2 Stoch-
I<i<n b/
Intersection of two L,-balls. Consider the following uncertainty set.
U := {b E R | ||bly, 1,|bl, r}, for 0 < r < 1 and 1 < pi < P2. (3.20)
Assume the following condition holds,
r 11 1I rm1 > mr2, (3.21)|e|i2 |iill1n
which guarantees that the intersection of the two unit norm balls is non-trivial. In
Appendix 3.10.1, we show that
1 r
sym(U) = , , e. (3.22)
rmPi rmP1 + 1
The budgeted uncertainty set. The budgeted uncertainty set is defined as,
Ak := b E [0, 1]m b < k , for 1 < k < m. (3.23)
In Appendix 3.10.1, we show that
k k
sym(Ak) - , bo(Ak) - e. (3.24)
m mn + k
Demand uncertainty set. We define the following set,
DU:= b E K Z ib- ISI <F VS C N :={1,...,} . (3.25)
Such a set can model the demand uncertainty where b is the demand of m products;
p and F are the center and the span of the uncertain range.
The set DU has different symmetry properties, depending on the relation between
y. and F. If p > F, the set DU is in fact symmetric. Intuitively, DU is the intersection
of an L, ball centered at pe with (2 ' - 2m) halfspaces that are symmetric with
respect to pe. If p, < F, DU is not symmetric any more - part of it is cut off by
the nonnegative orthant. In Appendix 3.10.1, we present a proof of the following
proposition, which summarizes the symmetry property of DU for all the cases.
Proposition 1. Assume the uncertainty set is DU.
1. If p > F. then,
sym(DU) = 1, bo(DU) = pe. (3.26)
1
2. If F < p<F, then,
m/np.+F T (vmp+F)(p±+F)
sym(DU) = ( bo(DU) p + ( + )e. (3.27)
(1 + s/'f ' vnip + (2 + v45-)F
1
3. IfO<p< F, then,
sym(DU) = -bo(DU) = + N 2 m)e. (3.28)
Vhi(lp + 1-)' 2 v/-np + (1 + vfm-)T
3.5 Multi-stage Stochastic Problem under RHS Un-
certainty
In this section, we consider the multi-stage stochastic optimization problem, I StochI
under right hand side uncertainty where the multi-stage uncertainty is described by
a directed network as discussed earlier. We show that a finitely adaptable class
of solutions is a good approximation for the fully-adaptable multi-stage problem.
Furthermore, the performance ratio of the finitely adaptable solution depends on the
geometric properties of the uncertainty sets in the multi-stage uncertainty network.
The number of solutions at each Stage (k + 1) for k = 1, . . . , K - 1 depends on the
number of directed paths in the uncertainty network from the root node to nodes in
Stage (k + 1). Therefore, if P is the set of all directed paths from Stage 2 to Stage
K, the total number of solutions in any stage in the finitely adaptable solution policy
is bounded by |PI.
Theorem 3. Let s = nin.j sym(ukj,14i) and p = maxkxj p(u,,UI). Suppose
Eb[b | b c U] > uh,, where Uk.j is the point of symmetry of UJh C R' for all
j = 1..., NA, k = 1,., K - 1. Then there is a finitely adaptable solution policy
that can be computed efficiently and has at most |P| solutions in each stage. where
P is the set of directed paths from the root node in Stage 2 to nodes in Stage K in
the multi-stage uncertainty network, such that the expected cost is at most (1 + p/s)
times the optimal cost of 1Koch
3.5.1 Algorithm
We first describe an algorithm to construct a finitely adaptable solution. In each Stage
(k + 1) for k = 1, . , K - 1, the set of finitely adaptable solutions contains a unique
solution corresponding to each directed path from the root node in Stage 2 to a node
in Stage (k + 1). Therefore, we consider P[k] I solutions in Stage (k + 1) each indexed
by P[k] for all P E P. In other words, the finitely adaptable solution is specified by
the first-stage solution x, and for each Stage (k + 1) for k = 1, ... , K - 1, yk(P[k])
for all P[k] E P[k]. Recall that for any P = (ji, ... , JK-1) E P, the probability that
the uncertain parameters realize from the path P is given by,
K-2
Pr(ji
. 
. )K-1 p = k jk+1' (3.29)
k=1
and the measure pp is defined as a product measure of the measures on the uncertainty
sets in Path P. We first show that for any k = 1, K - 1, j = 1, ... , Nk, (1 +p/s)-
Ukj dominates all points in Uk coordinatewise.
3
Lemma 5. For any k = 1...,K. j 1, Nk, for all u EH>
1 + Ukj > U.
Proof. Let pi = p(uk. "j), s1 = sym(uk.j, Uk) From Lemma 4, we know that
+ - U* > U, VU EL.
By definition in Theorem 3, we know that p1 < p and si > s. Therefore, for all
U E Uk
+ -Ukj > 1 + i Uk > U.
We consider the following multi-stage problem to compute the finitely adaptable
solution.
K-1
ZA min cT x + ( Epep[dk yk(P[k])]
k=1
s.t. VP = (j1 . . K- 1) E
K-1 K-1
Ax + ( Bkyk(P[k]) > (l + 1 Z ukik (3.30)
k=1 k=1
X E R"' x Rn
Yk(P[k]) E RPk x R n~-P, Vk K - 1.
The number of constraints in (3.30) is equal to P| - n, where mn is the number of
rows of A, Bk for all k =1,..., K - 1. Also, the number of decision variables in each
Stage (k + 1) for k = 1,..., K - 1 is IP[k]1, namely, yk(P[k]) for all P[k] E P[k].
Therefore, the solution is finitely adaptable as there are only a finite number of
solutions in each stage. Furthermore, in some cases, the number of directed paths
is small and polynomial in the size of the uncertainty network. For instance, if the
uncertainty network is a path, we require exactly one solution at each stage in our
finitely adaptable solution. If the network is a tree, then there is a single path to each
uncertainty set from the root node in Stage 2 and therefore, the number of solutions
in the finitely adaptable solution is exactly equal to the number of uncertainty sets
in the uncertainty network. However, in general, the number of directed paths can
be exponential in the input size. For example, for the case of a recombining directed
network in Figure 3-1. the number of directed paths from the root node to the node
j in Stage (k + 1), j = 1,. . . , Nk is equal to ('), which is exponential in k, while the
input size is 0(k 2 ).
In the next subsection, we show that the finitely adaptable solution computed
in (3.30) is a good approximation of a fully-adaptable optimal stochastic solution.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
For brevity, let r (1 + p/s). The proof proceeds as follows. We first consider a
particular finitely adaptable solution feasible to (3.30), which implies that its expected
cost is at least zA. We then extend this particular finitely adaptable solution to a
fully-adaptable one without changing its expected cost. Finally, we show that the
expected cost of the extended solution is equal to T times the expected cost of an
optimal fully-adaptable solution.
Let r, yk(w[k], P[k]) denote an optimal fully-adaptable solution for 1-[t for all
k 1,...,K - 1, P E P, pp-a.e. w E Q(P). For the first step of the proof, we
consider the following particular finitely adaptable solution for (3.30). For all P C P,
k = 1,...,IK - 1, let
Yk(P[k]) = r - EwE(P) [k(wjk, Pk])] . (3.31)
Also, let Y = r - -. We show that the above finitely adaptable solution is feasible
for (3.30). Consider any P (ji,... , JK ) E P. Now,
K-I K-I
As + Z Bk(wo [k], P[k]) > > b, pp-a.e. w = (b, ... , bK-1) Q(P).
k=1 k=1
Taking conditional expectation with respect to pp on both sides, we have that
K-1 K-i K
A. + ( BE,,p[yk (w[k], P[k])] > E Et,[bk] (Uk. (3.32)
k=1 k=1 k=1
where the last inequality follows as EY, bk] > UkJk. Therefore, for any P = (ji . JK 1) E
K-1
Az+( B+ jgk(P[k])
k=1
K-1
= A(T. -k)+(5 Bk (T - E, d[k (w[k], P[k])])
= T- AX+ Z BkK-,
k=i
[dfTpk(W[k], P[k])]
> T- S UkJk),
(k=1
(3.33)
where (3.33) follows from (3.32). Therefore, the solution Y, Y is a feasible solution
for (3.30). Let - be the expected cost of Y, V, i.e.,
K-I
S= c+ E Epp[d ik(P[k])].
k=1
Clearly, ZA < -. For the second step of the proof, we extend the finitely adaptable
solution Y, V to a feasible solutioii z, y for Ul1es as follows.
(3.34)
Y (w[k], P[k]) = Yk (P[k]), VP e P, Vk =1 K -1.
We show that the extended solution z, is a feasible solution for H'oci- Consider
any P (i,.4 ) E P, w = (bi 
.
bK-1) E Q(P). Therefore,
A- +
Axz+( ByfA(wti]P[k])
K- I
- Az+ ( Bkak(P[k])
K-1
> T - UkJk
K-I
> E b,
k=1
where (3.35) follows from the feasibility of the solution 2, V for (3.30) and the last
(3.35)
inequality follows from Lemma 5. Let Z be the expected cost of z, y, i.e.,
K-1
z = cT' + Y EpEp [IEp[d Tk(w[k], P[k])]]
k=1
K-1
- cTY+ EEpp [EtP[dk(P[k])]
k=1
K-1
-CTY + E3 Epe p[dkjYk(P[k])] (3.36)
k=1
where (3.36) follows from (3.34). Now, we compare z to the expected cost of an
optimal fully-adaptable solution as follows.
K-1
- cTi+ Z Epep[dgkk(P[k])]
k-kk=1
K-1
cT(T - x) + ( EpE [di(7 - E1, [Pk(w[k] , P[k])] )]
klkk=1
= r(3.37)
where (3.37) follows from the optimality of i, 9 for [K Combining ZA < - and
(3.37), we obtain that zA < _ - zscl-
Stochastic problem under cost and RHS uncertainty. For the multi-stage
stochastic problem, -Ie where both the objective coefficients and the rightStoch(b~d) we
hand side are uncertain, a finitely adaptable solution performs arbitrarily worse as
compared to the fully-adaptable solution. It follows from one of the results in Bertsi-
mas and Goyal [18], where the authors show that a static-robust solution may perform
arbitrarily worse as compared to an optimal fully-adaptable two-stage solution for the
stochastic problem when both cost and right hand side are uncertain.
3.6 Multi-stage Adaptive Problem
In this section, we consider multi-stage adaptive optimization problems and show that
a finitely adaptable solution is a good approximation to the fully-adaptable solution.
Furthermore, the performance bound of a finitely adaptable solution is related to the
symmetry and translation factors of the uncertainty sets as in the case of stochastic
optimization problems. The approximation guarantee for the case when only the right
hand sides of the multi-stage adaptive problem are uncertain, Hdapt, follows directly
from the approximation bounds for the stochastic problem. Surprisingly, we can also
show that a finitely adaptable solution is also a good approximation for the multi-
stage adaptive problem when both the right hand sides and the objective coefficients
are uncertain, Adapt(bd), unlike the stochastic counterpart. Our results generalize the
performance of a static robust solution for two-stage adaptive optimization problem
under right hand side and/or objective coefficient uncertainty.
3.6.1 Right-hand Side Uncertainty: Hff
We show that there is a finitely adaptable solution with at most |PI solutions for each
stage and each uncertainty set, that is a good approximation of the fully-adaptable
problem. Furthermore, such a finitely adaptable solution can be computed efficiently
using exactly the algorithm described in Section 3.5.1. The performance bound of the
finitely adaptable solution policy follows directly from its performance bound with
respect to the stochastic problem in Theorem 3. Therefore, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose s = ink,3 sym(U) and UkJ G Uk C Rtm is the point of
symmetry for allj 1,... ,ANk, k = 1,... K - 1. Let p = naxA.j p(U) for all
J = 1. Nk. k 1,. K - 1. Then there is a finitely adaptable solution policy
that can be computed efficiently and has at most [P| solutions in each stage, where P
is the set of directed paths from the root node to any node in Stage K of the multi-
stage uncertainty network, such that its worst-case cost is at most (1 + p/s) times the
optimal cost of Iadapt-
3.6.2 RHS and Cost Uncertainty
In this section, we consider the multi-stage adaptive optimization problem where
both the right hand side and the objective coefficients are uncertain. While for the
stochastic problem, the performance of a finitely adaptable solution can be arbitrarily
bad with respect to an optimal stochastic solution, surprisingly, we can show that
there exists a finitely adaptable solution with at most |PI solutions for each stage for
each uncertainty set, that is a good approximation for the multi-stage problem.
Theorem 5. Suppose s = mink,3 sym(d4) and Uk, E U1  C R'+"k is the point
of symmetry for all j - 1,...,Nk, k = 1,...,K - 1. Also, let ub, i denote
the right hand side and the objective coefficient uncertainty in Ukj respectively. Let
p = maxkJp(U) for all j 1,...,Nk, k = 1,...,K - 1. Then there is a finitely
adaptable solution policy that can be computed efficiently and has at most |P| solutions
where P is the set of directed paths from, the root node to any node in Stage K of the
multi-stage uncertainty network, such that its worst-case cost is at most (1 + p/s)2
times the optimal cost of HK
Adapt(b~d)
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know that for any uncertainty set in Stage (k + 1),
u <; (1 + p/s) -ukg for all u E Uk. We compute a finitely adaptable solution
by solving the following multi-stage problem similar to the one used to compute a
finitely adaptable solution for the stochastic counterpart.
K-1
min cTx + max muin dTy k(P[k])
PEP Vk(P[kI),k=1,...,K 1 k=1
s.t. VP (j
.
, jK- 1) E P
K-1 K-1
Ax + > Bkyk(P k ( + -> u- (3.38)
k=1 k=1
x (E RPI x Rn'+
yk(wlk],P[k]) E RPk X R' -P - - K - 1.
Note that the above problem is similar to (3.30) except the objective function. Using
an argument similar to the second part of the proof of Theorem 3 (see Section 3.5.2),
we can show that a finitely adaptable solution of (3.38) can be extended to a feasible
fully-adaptable solution for 1 atK )of the same worst-case cost.
Suppose (P, yk(w[k], P[k))) for all k = 1,..., K - 1, P E P, w E Q(P) denote
a optimal fully-adaptable solution for H'dapt(b, d). As defined earlier, for any P =
(ji... jK-1) E ,let
WP = (UI , --.... .UKJK ) (3.39)
Consider the following approximate solution for (3.38).
z 1+ - (3.40)
and for any P E P, for all k=1.K-1
(3.41)
For brevity, as before, let T = (1 + p/s). We first need to show that the solution z, Q
is feasible for (3.38). For any P = (ji,1 ... ,jK-1) E P,
K-1 ( K-1 K-
A. + E Bk'Ik(P[k]) = T - A + r > P k] ;> r T
k=1 k=1 (k=1
where the last inequality follows from the feasibility for QO for Wp. Thus, the solution
x, y is feasible for (3.38).
To bound the worst-case cost of the solution, we show that for any P E P, the cost
of the approximate finitely adaptable solution is at most (1I+p/s)2 times the worst-case
cost of the optimal fully-adaptable solution. Consider any P = (ji
.
jK1) E P.
yk(P[k]) =I( + &k (w[k], P [k]).
Now,
K-1 K-1
c i+(dkf4(P[k]) = r.(cT+(d Q (wp[k], P[k]))
k=1 k=1
K-1
<_T- (c + ( (r . k w k( p[k], P[k])) )(3.42)
k=1
T*~ ~~~~j c 2( 1 uJ)ik(wpt[k], P [k]))
< T 2  K (34ZAdapt(bd), (3.43)
where (3.42) follows as d r - a. for all (b, d) E Uj, k 1,... ,K - 1. Inequal-
ity (3.43) follows as wp E Q(P) and thus, is a feasible scenario in rAdapt(bd)- D
3.6.3 An Alternative Bound
In this section, we discuss an alternative bound for the performance of the finitely
adaptable solution as compared to the optimal fully-adaptable solution similar to the
one we present for the stochastic problem. For the sake of simplicity, we present this
alternative bound for the adaptive problem under right hand side uncertainty, Hapt -
The bound extends in a straightforward manner to the case of both right hand side
and cost uncertainty.
The proof of Theorem 4 (and also Theorem 5) is based on the construction of
a good finitely adaptable solution from an optimal fully-adaptable solution in the
following manner. For each P E P, we consider the scenario op where in each stage
the uncertain parameter realization is the point of symmetry of the corresponding
uncertainty set on path P. We show that the solution for scenario Wp scaled by a
factor (1 + p/s) is a good feasible finitely adaptable solution for all o E Q(P). Since
wp E Q(P), the cost for an optimal solution for this scenario is a lower bound on
z
4Aapt which implies a bound of (1 + p/s) for the finitely adaptable solution with
respect to the optimal. Now, if for some other scenario w'(P) E Q(P), a smaller
scaling factor than (1 + p/s) suffices to obtain a feasible finitely adaptable solution
for all w E Q(P) for all P E P, this would imply a smaller bound on the performance
of the finitely adaptable solution.
Following the discussion in Section 3.4.2, we define bh(U) as follows. For all
j1 . m,b (U) :maxbeu b. Let
0(U) = min{0 | Jb E U,0 . b > bh(U)
Note that 0(U) < (1+p/s) as (1+ p/s) -bo > bh(U), where bo is the point of symmetry
of U, p = p(bo,U), and s = sym(bo,U). Let bl(U) denote the vector b E U that
achieves the minimum value of 0. Let
a0 max 0(Uj).ak=1,...,Kj=1,...Nk
For each k 1,..., K - 1, j= 1,. . . , Nk, 0(Uj) is defined by a feasible uncertainty
realization from U . Therefore, scaling the solution corresponding to b(Uf) by a
factor 0* > 0(U) produces a feasible finitely adaptable solution. Also, as we note
above, 0* < (1 + p/s). Therefore, 0* is upper bounded by the bound in Theorem 4.
We refer to 0* as a scaling bound as earlier.
We can interpret the scaling bound geometrically as follows. For any U C R", let
0 = 0(U), b = bl(U), and bh = bh(U). We know that
0 b1 > bh - b > - b.
__0
Therefore, 1/0 is the minimum scaling factor for bh such that it is dominated by some
point in U coordinate-wise. Note that (1/0) . b does not necessarily belong to U but
is always contained in,
U = {b c R n IE b' c U, b' > b}. (3.44)
To see this, consider the following uncertainty set. U C R', where U is the convex hull
of ((0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)). We can alternatively define U as U = {b E [0, 1]3 | b3 =
bi + b2 }. It is easy to observe that bh = (1, 1, 1). We show that bl = (1/2, 1/2, 1) E U
and 0 = 2. We know that Ob) > 1 for all j = 1, 2. Therefore,
2
bl = bl + bl 2 -- 14 2+
Furthermore, b' < 1 which implies that 0 > 2. For 0 = 2, bl = (1/2,1/2, 1) E U
satisfies 0b' > bb. Now,
- - bh = -- ( 1) V U .
0 2
However, bl > (1/0)bh, and bl C U which implies that (1/0)bh E O2 as defined
in (3.44). The geometric picture is given in Figure 3-7. Note that in Figure 3-7,
bl = (1/0)bh but this is not true in general as illustrated in the above example.
Figure 3-7: A geometric perspective on the adaptability gap.
For certain uncertainty sets, the scaling bound of 0* is strictly
bound in Theorem 4.
better than the
1. Hypercube. Suppose each uncertainty set in the multi-stage uncertainty net-
work is a hypercube. Therefore, s = 1. Also, suppose p = 1 where p is as
defined in Theorem 4. The bound in Theorem 4 is (1 + p/s) = 2. On the
other hand, 0* = 1 since bh(lU) E U,, when U is a hypercube. Therefore, the
two bounds are in fact different. The scaling bound implies that the finitely
2b
adaptable solution is optimal, while the symmetry bound implies that it is only
a 2-approximation for the multi-stage adaptive optimization problem.
2. Hypersphere. Suppose the uncertainty sets are all hyperspheres in R', i.e.,
L 2 -balls, with unit radius and centered at e - (1, 1,...,1). Therefore, p = 1
and also s = 1 which implies that the bound from Theorem 4 is 2. On the other
hand, it is easy to note that the scaling bound,
2
In this case, the scaling bound is not significantly better than the bound in
Theorem 4.
3.7 Extension to General Convex Cones
We consider extensions of our results to the case where the constraints are general
linear conic inequalities and the uncertainty set belongs to the underlying cone. For
simplicity, we discuss the two-stage case. The generalization also applies to the multi-
stage problems.
3.7.1 Stochastic Problem with Linear Conic Constraints
Ve consider the following two-stage conic stochastic optimization problem.
z : min cTx + E d'y(b)]
'soh x~y(b) I d ()
s.t. Ax + 13y(b) bc b, p-a.e. b E U, (3.45)
x E RP' x R"' P1
y(b) E RP2 x Rn2--P2
where K is a closed pointed convex cone in a finite dimensional space, such as the
nonnegative orthant R', the second-order cone (SOC) {(b, t) (E R" b : 11b||2 <_ t},
and the semidefinite cone S'. Here A, B are mappings from R"1 and Rn2 to the
finite dimensional space that contains K, respectively. For example, if K is the
nonnegative orthant or the second-order cone, both A and B are matrices of the
appropriate dimension. If K is the semi-definite (SDP) cone, then A, B are linear
mappings defined as,
ni n2
Ax=( xiA, By = Z yiBi,
i=1 i=1
where Ai and B are symmetric matrices. The linear conic inequality (3.45) is equiv-
alent to the inclusion in the cone, i.e., Ax + By(b) >-K b e Ax + By(b) - b E K.
Lemma 6. Suppose the convex, compact set U C K, and bo is the point of symmetry
of U. Then,
1 + j bo >- b, Vb E U.
Proof. By the definition of symmetry and the assumption that U C K, we have for
any b c U, bo + sym(U)(bo - b) = (sym(U) + 1)bo - sym(U)b E K. I
Theorem 6. Consider the two-stage stochastic optimization problem in (3.45). Let
p be the probability measure on the uncertainty set U, bo be the point of symmetry
of U, and p =- p(bo,U) be the translation factor of bo with respect to U. Denote
s = sym(U). Assume the probability measure p satisfies, Ep[b] -c bo. Then the cost
of an optimal static solution is at most (1 + p/s) - zsh-
The proof of the above theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. For the sake
of completeness, we present the proof of Theorem 6 in Appendix 3.10.2. A similar
result holds for the corresponding adaptive optimization problem as well.
3.8 Extensions to Integer Variables
We can extend our results to the case when some decision variables are integer con-
strained for both the stochastic as well as the adaptive optimization problems. In the
case of the multi-stage stochastic optimization problem with right hand side uncer-
tainty, we can handle integer decision variables only in the first stage. Whereas for
the multi-stage adaptive problem, we can handle integer decision variables in every
stage for both versions, UIIapt and HK
Adapt Adapt(b,d)'
3.8.1 Multi-stage Stochastic Problem
We consider the multi-stage stochastic problem, H as defined in (3.5) with an
additional constraint that some of the first-stage decision variables x are required to
be integers. Even for this case, we show that a finitely adaptable solution provides a
good approximation.
Theorem 7. Consider the multi-stage stochastic problem HOI (3.5). with additional
integer constraints on some first stage decision variables. Suppose Eb[b | b E U]=
UkJ for all j = 1, ... , Nk,. k = 1, . .,K - 1. Let s = minkJ sym(UkJy, U) and
p = maxk.I P(UkJJb1). Then there is a finitely adaptable solution policy that can be
computed efficiently and has at most |P| solutions in each stage. where P is the set of
directed paths from the root node to nodes in Stage K in the multi-stage uncertainty
network, such that the expected cost is at most [(1 + p/s)] times the optimal cost.
The proof of Theorem 7 is exactly similar to the proof of Theorem 3 except
that we need to handle the integrality constraints in constructing a feasible finitely
adaptable solution. Therefore, instead of scaling the optimal fully-adaptable solution
by a factor of (1 + p/s) to construct a feasible finitely adaptable solution,we need
to scale by [(1 + p/s)] to preserve the integrality constraints. This implies that the
performance ratio of the finitely adaptable solution with respect to an optimal fully-
adaptable solution is at most [(1 +p/s)]. Note that the stochastic problem, with both
right hand side and objective coefficients uncertainty, can not be well approximated
by a finitely adaptable solution even without the integrality constraints.
3.8.2 Multi-stage Adaptive Optimization Problem
For the multi-stage adaptive problem, we can handle integer decision variables in all
stages. In particular, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 8. Consider the multi-stage adaptive problem, UK1 (3.6), with addi-
tional integer constraints on some decision variables in each stage. Suppose s
mink,3 sym(U4) and Uk, E Uk is the point of symmetry for all j 1,..., Nk,
k = 1,... ,K - 1. Let p = maxkJp(U 3 ) for all j = 1,...,Nk, k = 1,..., K - 1.
Then there is a finitely adaptable solution policy that can be computed efficiently and
has at most |P| solutions where P is the set of directed paths from the root node to
any node in Stage K of the multi-stage uncertainty network, such that its worst-case
cost is at most [(1 + p/s)] times the optimal cost.
Theorem 9. Consider the multi-stage adaptive problem, Udaat(bd) (3.8), with ad-
ditional integer constraints on some decision variables in each stage. Suppose s =
minkJ sym(U ) and Uk. 3' E U is the point of symmetry for all j = 1...,Nk,
k - 1,..., K -1. Also, let u b, U d denote the right hand side and the objective coeffi-
cient uncertainty in Ukj respectively. Let p - maxk,3 p(uk,,j ) for all j = 1..., Nk,
k= 1,.,K - 1. Then there is a finitely adaptable solution policy that can be com-
puted efficiently and has at most |P| solutions where P is the set of directed paths
from the root node to any node in Stage K of the multi-stage uncertainty network,
such that its worst-case cost is at most [(1 + p/s)] - (1 + p/s) times the optimal cost
ofAdapt(bd)-
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose tractable solution policies for two-stage and multi-stage
stochastic and adaptive optimization problems and relate the performance of the
approximate solution approaches with the fundamental geometric properties of the
uncertainty set. For a fairly general stochastic optimization problem, we show that
the performance of a static robust solution for the two-stage problem and a finitely
adaptable solution for the multi-stage problem is related to the symmetry and trans-
lation factor of the uncertainty sets. In particular, the performance bound is (1 + p/s)
where p is the translation factor of the uncertainty sets and s is the symmetry. We
also show that the bound is tight, i.e.., given any symmetry and translation factor,
there exists a family of instances where the uncertainty sets have the given symmetry
and translation factor, and the cost of an optimal static robust solution is exactly
equal to (1 + p/s) times the optimal stochastic cost. For most commonly used un-
certainty sets, the performance bound gives quite interesting results. For instance,
if the sets are perfectly symmetric, i.e., s = 1, the bound is less than or equal to 2.
Refer to Table 3.1 for a list of examples of several interesting uncertainty sets and
corresponding bounds. In any model, the uncertainty set is the modeler's choice. Our
bound offers important insights in this choice of uncertainty set as well.
While we show that the stochastic problem with only right hand side uncertainty
can be well approximated, the static robust solution and the finitely adaptable solu-
tion are not a good approximation for the case where both the right hand side and the
objective coefficients are uncertain. However, for the adaptive optimization problem,
we show that the static robust and the finitely adaptable solution are a good approx-
imation for the two-stage and multi-stage version respectively, even when both the
right hand side and the objective coefficients are uncertain. The performance bound
in this case is (1 + p/s)2 where again p is the translation factor of the uncertainty sets
and s is the symmetry. This bound is not as strong as the bound for the stochastic
problem. We also present an alternate geometric bound for this case.
3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Examples: Symmetry of Specific Sets
Our main tool in calculating the symmetry of a convex compact set is the following
proposition in Belloni and Freund [5],
Proposition 2 (Belloni and Freund [5]). Let S be a convex body, and consider the
representation of S as the intersection of halfspaces: S =x C R'|aTx < bi i. E I}
for some (possibly unbounded) index set I. and let of :naxxes{ -ax} for i E I.
Then for all x - S.
(bi-a T x
sym(x. S) = inf b a
16 f + a x
General L, half-ball for p > 1.
Define an L, half-ball as
HB: {b E Rm | ||bI, < 1, bi > 0}.
The dual norm is the Lq norm with 1 + = 1. The symmetry of L, half-ball isp q
summarized as follows,
Proposition 3. The symmetry and point of symmetry of an L, half-ball are,
sym(HB,)=
2 ~
bo(HBp) =- 1 ei
25 + 1
Proof. The L, half-ball can be represented by halfspaces as
HB, = {b E Rm | - bl < 0, 7tT b < 1, Vl|7r||q < 1, 7r1 ;> 0}.
For each 7r in the dual unit ball (i.e., ||7r||q = 1), define
6*(-7r) := max -7t Tb,||b||p<1,bi>0
whose optimum b* satisfies b* = 0, |b*I|p = 1. Therefore we have,
*(7r) - m ax - -r b = * 1q = (1 - 7 )l/I ,
||b||q=1
where b = (bi; b) and 7r = (ri; f). Also define 6*(ei) =max 61
bEHB,
= 1. Now we can
compute the symmetry of HB,. Due to the geometry, the point of symmetry has the
form bo = ae 1 . We have,
sym(HBp) = max min
aE[0,1] I
inf
7i E[O.1} (1 _ 7 ± rr
The maximum is achieved when the inf term is equal to the second term, because the
inf term is decreasing in a and the second term is increasing in a. The inf term has
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optimality condition,
-a((1 + -rr)+7ria) = 1-Tia) 7r 1 + a).
Therefore, we have,
a a
-a 1
(1--1)1
which implies that = 1, i.e., 71 = ( and a .
(1-71)P 2P+1
Intersection of an L, ball with R' for p > 1.
Recall that an La-ball intersected with the nonnegative orthant is defined as B :
{b E R'" |1 |bl| 1. b > 0}. We show that the symmetry and symmetry point of B+
are as defined in (3.18). The L, half-ball can be represented by halfspaces as
B = {b E R' | b < 0, 7b 1,V|7r|< 1, 7r > 0}
where |1|.q is the dual-norm with 1+ 1 = 1. Therefore, define 6*(r) := max -7 rT b = 0,P q bEB/
and *(ek) =max bk = 1. Therefore, the symmetry can be computed as,
bEB+p
sym(B ) : max imi inf 1-aeIr a
symE{0,(}) ]P C O~ P 117rq 1.ir>O CVeTir 
-
where we use the property that the symmetry point b0 = ae for some a E [0, 1 /1 e|p].
The maximum is achieved when the inf term is equal to the second term. The inf
term can be computed, since max eT7r =|ell. Thus, at the symmetry point,l7irjq=1,7t>O
1 a 1 1
we have 1 - . Therefore, a , which gives thealle||, - -a |ell +1 m1 + 1
results.
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Ellipsoidal uncertainty set.
An ellipsoidal uncertainty set that is contained in the nonnegative orthant can be
defined as,
U := {b I |JE(b - b)11 2 < 1} C R (3.46)
We assume the ellipsoid has full dimension, thus, b > 0. The symmetry of an ellipsoid
is 1. But the translation factor depends on the position of the center b. The following
proposition computes the translation factor.
Proposition 4. Assume the uncertainty set U is defined in (3.46). The translation
factor p(b, U) is given as,
p(b, U) = max - ,
where E,-i is the i-th diagonal element of the inverse matrix E-.
Proof. From the definition, the translation factor is the smallest p such that
b := min{bi|11E(b - pb)112 < 1} 0, Vi = 1, 2, . m.
From the optimality conditions, we can get that b' = pIi - E71, which gives the
result.
Intersection of two L, balls with R".
Consider the uncertainty set U defined in (3.20) where 1 < pi < P2, 0 < r < 1, and
suppose (3.21) holds. We show that the symmetry and symmetry point of U are as
defined in (3.22).
The uncertainty set U can be represented by the intersection of halfspaces,
U {b C R' | - b < O,7 rTb <1 A b< r V||7r||q1 - 177r 0, IAJ2I rA >0 01
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where ± + y 1, ± + = 1. Compute the following quantities,Pi qj P2 q2
*(7r) := max - 7rTbbEU 0, V||Tr||ql < 1, 7r > 0,
*(A) :=max AT b = 0, VIAI|q2 < r, A> 0,beU
6*(ek) := inaxbk = r,
bc=U
Vk = 1. n.
Since the set U is symmetric with respect to the direction e, the symmetry point
must have the form bo = ae. The symmetry can be computed as,
sym(U) :=max min
aE[OI(-ML) { I
1 -aeTK
inf
|17 j=1,7r>0 OZeT7r
1-aeTA a .
inf
IAIlq2=1,A>O aeTA r - a
(3.47)
As is shown in the proof of the previous proposition, we have,
1 - aeTir 1in 
- 1, 7 7
||-|1q,=1,7r>O aeT7r a||e||1 1
iif 1 - aeTA r
IAlle2 =1,A>0 aeCTA a||e||,,
Using condition (3.21), we know the first term is dominated by the second term for
any a, therefore, the maximum in the symmetry formula (3.47) is achieved when
1 a
a||e||,, r - a
rTherefore, a =
r||e||p, + 1 rn , which gives the results.rmap + 1
Budgeted uncertainty set.
An important type of uncertainty sets is the budgeted uncertainty set, Ak as defined
in (3.23). We show that the symmetry and the symmetry point are as defined in (3.24).
First, we observe that the symmetry point bo(Ak) must be of the form bo = ae,
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due to the geometry of Ak. Then, use Proposition 2, for k > 1, we have,
sym(Ak) - max min
o<ca (k
a k - ma
1-aa ma
By the monotonicity of 1 a and M0 , the maximum is achieved at a k Thus,
mnk
the symmetry point of Ak is bo = e and sym(Ak) = .
Demand uncertainty set.
Proof. Proposition 1 For p > F, the hypercube centered at pe is completely contained
in the positive orthant. For each S, define
6*(S+) := max -e b
bcDU = -ISp + yIfSIF.
*(S-) := max e b = ISly + V/ISIF.
bEDU
The symmetry of b is given as follows,
mmiS T I± IS IF - eb
SCDU -+y (SIF+ejb
-ISIp + vISjF + e~b
Sp + yISIF - e-b
Therefore, sym(pe, DU) = 1, which proves (3.26).
For 'SF < p < F, p is in one of the intervals of [IF, F), [ F, '], ... , (' F F).
We show that (3.27) holds for p E [ F, F]. A similar argument works for other in-
tervals.
Let us assume p E [ F, F]. Notice that |Slp - VI-SIF > 0 for all ISI > 2.
Therefore, the constraints in the definition of DU (3.25) can be written as,
ISIy - V/I5IF < ) bi < |Sip + -/IfSlE, VIS| 2 2.
But for all IS= 1, since p - F < 0, we will have 0 < bi < p + F for all i. = 1,.. .,Tm.
Thus, according to Proposition 2, we can compute the following quantities for all
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sym(b, DU)
|S| > 2,
*(S+) :=max -e - -Tb ISly + VIIF,
bEDU
6*(S_) :=max elsb = |S~p + VI5IF,bEDU
and for ISI = 1, we have 6*(i+) := maxbEDU -bi = 0, *(=) maXbEDu i = y- + F
for all i 1, ... , m. Since DU is symmetric about the direction e, the point of
symmetry has the form be ae. The range of possible a is determined by the
constraint myT - VhmF < ma < my + m/nF. Now we can compute the symmetry of
ae,
sym(ae, DU) = min + F)
a
a a (ISII + /Sr) -SIla
(p1 + F) - Oz' (-|lyl- + 0/I5IF) + Isla,
( SII + SIIF)
(ISIvp + IS/IF) -
+ Isla, VISI >
- ISla
2 1. (3.48)
The symmetry of DU is given as,
1
sym(DU) = max{sym(ae, DU) : a E [p - IF, p
/irn
1
+ F]}.
O/n-
Observe that (ISlu+ SIP) ISjO is a decreasing function in a, and ISIf'+ SIP)+ is
an increasing function in a. Both functions have value 1 when a = , and decrease
when |Sj increases. The formula (3.48) can be simplified as,
sym(ae. DU) .m { (p + F) a (mp+ if)-ma
a '+(p +F) - a ( -mp + FniF) + ma
( -mp + FnmiF) + ma
(np + /mF) - ma
The maximum of sym(ae, DU) is achieved at the following intersection,
a (mp + fimF) - ma
(p + F) -a (-mp + /ni +F) ma'
which gives the symmetry and the symmetry point in (3.27). Since (3.49) also holds
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(3.49)
when p is in any other interval, it implies that (3.27) is true for all 1_ < p < F.
When 0 < y < 1 F, following a similar argument, we have,
sym(ae, DU) min{(!S~p + 95 ) - ISIa ISIaisi;>1 |SIa (| S IpI + yI(I± F) - S I
Then, the maximum is achieved when a (mp + mF)-ma(p + F) - a ma
gives the results in (3.28).
which
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Parallel slabs.
A parallel slab is defined as PS := {b E R' I L < eTb < U} for 0 < L < U and
U > 0. The symmetry and symmetry point of a parallel slab is given as,
Proposition 5.
sym(PS) (3.50)U7 (3.50)
(3.51)bo(PS) = - e.(m + 1)U - Le
Proof. Define the following quantities,
6* := max eT b = U,L bEPS
6* T
* := max -e bbEPS
and for each k 1,...,m,
6*(ek) := max eT b = U.bEPS
According to the geometry of the set, the point of symmetry is of the form bo = ae.
Thus, the symmetry can be written as,
max mina,
aE[L-L U -ma'
U -ma a
ma - L' U - a
The first two terms are inverse of each other, therefore one increasing and the other
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sym(PS)
decreasing in a; the third term is increasing in a. Thus, the maximum is attained
when the second term is equal to the third, i.e.,
u - ma a
ma - L U - a
which gives the results.
U = Conv(Ai, {e}).
The convex hull of the standard n-simplex A1 = {b E Rrn | eTb < 1, b > 0} and a
point e = (1. 1)T has a slightly improved symmetry comparing with the simplex
itself, as shown below.
Proposition 6. The symmetry and point of symmetry of U = Conv(Ai, {e}) are
given as.
1
sym(U) = ,I
rn - 1
1
bo(U) = -e.
mn
Proof. The set U can be represented by halfspaces as
U b E R'" | - b < o,7r b < 1,VI = .,
where 7ri has (2 - m) in the i-th entry and 1 elsewhere. For each i, define,
-max bi
beU
1. (7ri)* - max -7r Tb = i - 2.
beU
By the symmetry of U, we know the symmetry point should be on the e direction.
Therefore, we have,
sym(U) = max min(Ilo0il {I
1 - Tzf
air e
(rn - 2) + air fe'
{ 1-a a '= max min , .
oCl,1) m - 2+ a' - a
The maximum is achieved when 21 = 1 which gives a
mm2+- I and symmetry is
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(3.52)
(3.53)
The matrix simplex.
Define the uncertainty set U as follows,
U = {B E Sn I I B < 1}, (3.54)
where ST is the cone of positive semidefinite matrices, I is the identity matrix. We
use it as an example of uncertainty sets for robust SDP problems. The following
proposition shows that U has a similar symmetry property as a simplex in Rm
Proposition 7. Let U be defined in (3.54) and BO be the center of symmetry of U.
We have.
1 1
sym(U)-= , Bo- I.
m m + 1
Proof. The set U can be written in the form of intersection of halfspaces,
U = {B E S' T) * B < 1,Vll42 1-
Then, we can compute the following quantities,
(q) = max (qqT) * B = max (q p) 2  1, (3.55)
BGU p:IIpII=
*(I)=-mi IB =0. (3.56)
BEU
The second equality in (3.55) comes from the fact that the extreme points of U are
rank-i matrices ppT with pTp = 1. (3.56) follows from I * B > 0 and the minimum
is achieved at B = 0. Now we can compute the symmetry of U as,
1 - I * B (qq)*B
sym(U) = max min , iB f T) B (3.57)
BEu I*eB 'q:jjgn=1 1 - (qq)eB
To compute the inf term is equivalent to solving the following problem, which admits
a closed form solution by Courant minimax theorem: A, (B) min gq=1 qTBq,
where A, (B) is the smallest eigenva.lue of B, denoted as (A,, Am) in ascending
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order. Then, (3.57) can be rewritten as,
sym(U) max min 1 TA I, ,
eTx<l,x>o e'A 1-__J'
which can be reformulated as,
sym(U) = max{z : eTA < I , eTA 1, A > 0,&
z,'A -z+ 1
From the constraints, we have
1 rnz
z+1 z+1 n
In fact, z = 1/rn can be achieve by the feasible solution Ai 1/(n + 1) for all i. This
completes the proof.
3.10.2 Proof of Theorem 6.
Proof. Theorem 6 Let U' be the translation of the uncertainty set U with the trans-
lation factor p, i.e. U' U - (1 - p)bo. Let b1 := bo - (1 - p)bo.
z := bo - bi = (1 - p)bo. Following a similar argument as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1. we have
+ - bi >- b', Vb' E U'.
Translating back to the origiial uncertainty set U by adding z on both sides, we
have,
+ bi + z >- b, Vb E U,
( + )pbo + (1 - p)bo >, b,
1 + bo -ic b,
Vb E U,
Vb E U. (3.59)
For brevity, let T := (1 + p/s). Suppose (x, y(b), y -a.e. b E U) is an optimal solution
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(3.58)
z
'> z ,Vi
z + 1
Also let
1,..., 
m.}
of the stochastic optimization problem (3.45). We have,
A(-rx) + B(ry(b)) >-x Tb, pu-a.e. b E U.
Equivalently,
A(TX)+B(Ty(b))- Tb E K, p-a.e. b E U.
Therefore, the expectation with respect to the probability measure y satisfies,
A(TX) + B(E,[Ty(b)]) - E,[Tb] c K.
Thus, we have
A(TX)+ B(EI, [ry(b)]) >-c E,[rb] >-r Tbo >-K b, Vb E U.
The last inequality uses (3.59). Therefore, (Tx, E.[TY(b)]) is a feasible static robust
solution. Therefore, the cost of an optimal static robust solution is at most,
CT(TX)+ dTE, [TY(b)]
Furthermore, zstoch CTx + dTIE, [y(b)], which implies that the cost of an optimal
static solution is at most r - zT e
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T(CTx + dTEI[y(b)]).
No. Uncertainty set Symmetry Stochasticity gap
{b: ||bl|| < 1, b > O}
{b : ||b - blip < 1, b1 > b1} C R M
1 p < oo
3 {b :b - b 1, b1 > b}c R
{b: ib - blip < 1} C RT
{b :||E(b- b)||12 < 1} C Ri
6 {b : I|b|,, < 1, I|b|I, 2 <r,b2 0O
7 Budgeted uncertainty set Ak(1 < k < rn)
Demand uncertainty set DU(p, F)8 (p>F)
Demand uncertainty set DU(p, F)
9 ( F < p < F)
Demand uncertainty set DU(p , F)
10 (0 < p< F)
{b: L < eTb < U, b > 01
conv(A,, {e})
conv(bi,..., bk)
{B ST I IeB < 11
1/
1/
1
1
1
1
1
1I+ mT n .P
1+ max b (b)
1<i< m
1 + max (ab)
1<i<m
1+ max b (ab)
1<i<mn
E'
1+ max >(ab)
1<i<m b
1+ rnP1 (ab)
1+ ab>k
F
1 + (ab)
vnp, + F
(1 + v/ni)F
v/nip + F
m/n(pu + F)
1
rn1 - L
U
m -i
1< <
1
mn
(1 + v/n)F
1~t + aFs
+b + F)1 + F
(nI + 1) (a.b)U
ru (a.b)
b h
max - ()
1<i<m b
1 + i (a
Table 3.1: Symmetry and corresponding stochasticity gap for various uncertainty sets.
Note that footnote (a) or (b) means the tight bound is from the symmetry bound
(3.13) or the scaling bound (3.17).
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Chapter 4
A Fairness-based Proposal for
Electricity Market Design
4.1 Introduction
The electricity industry has undergone significant deregulation and restructuring in
several regions of the United States since the late 1990s [79]. Vertically integrated
utility companies have been restructured; electricity production and transmission
were separated into different enterprises; Independent System Operators (ISO) and
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) have been established to manage the
regional transmission grids and wholesale electricity markets. Today, ten ISOs and
RTOs serve two-thirds of the electricity consumers in the United States and more
than half of the population in Canada,. Although more than a decade has passed,
some fundamental issues on electricity market design still remain hotly debated in
both academia and industry. Our work aims to provide new perspective and proposals
to some of these issues.
We focus on the day-ahead (DA) electricity market, which exhibits some of the
most difficult issues in market design. A day-ahead market schedules the supply
and consumption of electricity for the next day. Two essential components of a DA
market include an auction scheme that determines the production and consumption
levels of all market participants. and a pricing scheme that determines the electricity
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price [29, 49]. Most ISOs adopt the social welfare maximization principle and a
marginal cost pricing scheme (throughout the chapter, we denote them as MaxSW
and MCP, respectively). In this scheme, the auction decisions are made by solving a
unit commitment problem - a mixed integer optimization problem with the objective
to maximize the total social welfare while satsifying various operation, reliability, and
security constraints; the electricity price is determined as the incremental cost of
producing one more unit of electricity, which is derived from the dual solution of a
linear economic dispatch problem with fixed integer decisions.
A long noticed shortcoming of the MaxSW-MCP scheme is the so-called uplift
problem [59]. The uplift problem is that the electricity payment determined by the
electricity price cannot fully recover the production cost (especially the fixed cost) of
some committed generators; the ISO has to arrange side payments for such generators
to make up the loss.
Both academic researchers and industrial practitioners are in active search for a
solution. Recent proposals have focused on augmenting the current MaxSW-MCP
scheme by introducing prices for integer decisions [67, 88, 50, 44]. Enhancing market
transparency and competitiveness is clearly an important goal as claimed by the
existing proposals. In our opinion, the uplift problem is a symptom of what we
consider a deeper fairness problem in the currently used MaxSW-MCP scheme: some
generators that produce electricity make no profit, while other market participants,
especially on the consumer side, collect considerable utility surpluses.
To address this inequity, we introduce and investigate the notion of I-fairness that
addresses the tradeoff between social welfare and fairness. The case # = 0 corresponds
to current practice of maximizing social welfare, whereas 3 = 1 corresponds to a so-
lution that maximizes the minimum utility among market participants, the so-called
max-min fairness. Under the max-min fairness principle, every market participant
is guaranteed a nonnegative surplus, so no side payments are needed, and thus the
uplift problem is naturally solved. By varying 4, we investigate the tradeoff between
efficiency and fairness of the auction and pricing scheme. We formulate a family of
mixed integer optimization models that explicitly parametrizes this tradeoff. The so-
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lutions for different parameter values are used to generate an efficiency-fairness curve,
which demonstrates a significant improvement of fairness in our proposed schemes.
Such a frontier plot also illustrates a flexible tradeoff between efficiency and fairness
achieved by our proposal, and thus, it can be used to facilitate the ISO's decision-
making in choosing an appropriate operating point of its market. We further show
that the current operational practice (/ = 0) is not Pareto efficient, while there is a
,30 < 1, at which the social welfare is the same as current practice, while the fairness
property is strictly better, and the side payments are strictly lower than current prac-
tices. This gives a solution to another long noticed problem of the current practice,
namely achieve fairness and integrity of the auction in choosing from multiple (near)
optimal solutions. We broadly investigate the properties of such 4-fair solutions both
theoretically and empirically.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we review the auction and
pricing scheme implemented in the current day-ahead electricity markets, and il-
lustrate the uplift problem in a simple example. In Section 4.3, we introduce the
concept of max-min fairness, and propose a new auction and pricing scheme based on
max-mi fairness. We discuss in detail the properties, computational methods, and
economic implications of max-min fairness. In Section 4.4, we introduce the notion
of 4-fairness that interpolates between maximum welfare and max-min fairness and
explore its properties. In Section 4.5, we investigate the case of 4-fairness as # -3 0
and propose a new pricing scheme. We show that under this pricing scheme the social
welfare is the same as current practice, while the max-min fairness is achieved, and
the side payments are strictly lower than current practices. We also show such a
pricing scheme is, in a sense, the most likely to eliminate uplift payment among any
pricing schemes. In Section 4.6, we apply the proposed 4-fairness to a large scale
problem based on ISO New England day-ahead market. Finally, we conclude with
some discussion of future research.
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4.2 The current day-ahead market auction and pric-
ing scheme
A day-ahead electricity market is a forward market that determines the supply and
consumption of electricity for the next operating day. In such a market, generating
units submit offer bids to the ISO. An offer bid is usually composed of two parts, a
variable cost part which specifies the functional relation between the supply quantity
and the marginal cost of production, and a fixed cost part which comprises of start-
up cost, shut-down cost, and no-load cost. Other information such as the ramp rate
(i.e., how fast a generator can change its output level) is also requested by the ISO
for scheduling purpose. The demand side is composed of fixed demand, which has
a fixed consumption level regardless of the electricity price, as well as price-sensitive
demand, whose consumption level is a function of electricity price as described in a
demand bid.
Using the bidding information collected from the market participants, the ISO
solves an auction and pricing problem that clears the market by determining the
commitment status and production levels of generators, consumption levels of de-
mand, and the electricity price. For this purpose, most ISOs in the United States
adopt the social welfare maximization auction and marginal cost pricing (IaxSW-
MCP) scheme. The objective is to maximize the total utility of the system, subject to
energy balance constraint, transmission network constraints, and other physical and
security constraints. Then, the electricity price is determined by the shadow price of
the energy balance constraint. This price is also called the uniform electricity price,
since it is constant at all different locations in the network. In reality, the shadow
prices of the transmission constraints are also incorporated, so that the electricity
prices are the sum of the uniform price and a component that is locational depen-
dent. In the following, we present a simplified IaxSW-MCP model, where we only
consider a single period auction with no transmission constraints. We also assume all
the demand bids are price sensitive. We will discuss later the implication of relaxing
these limitations.
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Let g be the set of generators, D be the set of consumers in the day-ahead mar-
ket. Let p and Pi be the minimum and maximum levels of production specified in
generator j's offer bid. Similarly, di and di are the minimum and maximum levels of
consumption specified in consumer s's demand bid. For each generator j E G, the bi-
nary variable xj is the commitment status (i.e., xj = 1 if the generator j is committed
to production, xj = 0 otherwise), and the continuous variable pj is the production
level in mega-watt (MW). The generation cost, Cj(p, xy) = fjx + cj(pj), contains
both fixed cost fj and variable cost cj (pj) as a function of pj. For each consumer
i E- D, di is the consumption level, and Bi(di) is the bid price function. In the current
bidding convention, Cj(pj, xj) is a piecewise nondecreasing linear function of the pro-
duction level p. Each linear piece is described by a bidding block. The consumer bid
Bi(di) is usually a linear function of consumption level di. The MaxSW-I\ICP scheme
is implemented by the following constrained mixed integer optimization model,
max E Bi(di) 
- C (pj,x )
x,p,d E 9isD jEG
s.t. p- di = 0, (A), (energy balance)
jE9 ieD
p.xi < Pi pixi, Vi C G, (production level bounds)
K di < di, Vi E D, (consumption level bounds)
X E {0, 1), Vi E G.
The electricity price A (in dollars per mega-watt hour) is the dual variable of the
energy balance constraint in the corresponding linear optimization problem, where
the binary variable x is fixed at its optimal value. Using the interpretation of shadow
prices, we know that the electricity price A is the marginal cost of supplying one more
unit of electricity at the optimal level of production and consumption.
The above objective function can also be written as the sum of the utilities of
all generators and consumers, thus illustrating the nature of the social welfare maxi-
mization. In particular, the utility uj of a generator j E G is defined as the difference
between its revenue and bid costs, i.e., u - Apj - Cj(pj, xj). The utility ui of a
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consumer i E D is defined as the customer surplus, i.e., ui = Bj(di) - Adj. Then,
applying energy balance constraint EJEg Pi =ZEiED di, we have
S Bi(dj) - ( Cjp3 ,x ) = (Bi(d) - Adj) + E (Apj - Cj(pj, xj))
iEV ie jg
= (u, + 5 uj = Social Welfare.
i ED jc9
Thus, the MaxSW solution maximizes the total wellness of the system, and, from
a cost point of view, it is regarded as economically efficient. It is worth noticing
that the social welfare is independent of the electricity price. In other words, the
maximum economic efficiency can be obtained with different electricity prices. The
auction determines the overall efficiency of the solution, while the pricing scheme
affects the distribution of utility among participants. Other pricing schemes can be
used together with the MaxSW auction to achieve certain welfare distribution purpose
without sacrificing the system efficiency. We will propose one such pricing scheme
later in the chapter.
According to current practice, if a committed generator j has a negative utility,
that is., the revenue Apj is strictly less than the as-bid generation cost C (p, xr), then
the ISO compensates such a generator by paying a side payment that covers any loss,
i.e., the side payment is equal to max{C(pj, xj) - Apj, }. This payment is called the
uplift payment. The following simple example of four generators and two consumers
illustrates the MaxSW-MCP scheme and the uplift payment.
Consumer Bid Price d d
1 30 0 120
2 30 0 120
Generator Var Cost Fixed Cost p T)
1 15 150 50 100
2 16 140 0 100
3 19 120 50 100
4 22 100 0 100
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Throughout this chapter, the price or cost is always in $/MWh, and the produc-
tion or consumption level is in MW. The utility is measured in dollars. Under the
MaxSW-MCP scheme, both consumers are served at their maximum demand level.
The following table shows the electricity price, the generation levels, and the utilities.
The first four utilities are the utilities of the generators, and the last two are con-
sumers' utilities. The last column is the social welfare. As expected from the MaxSW
property, this is the highest level of social welfare achievable in this example.
Scheme Price Production Utilities SW
MaxSW-MCP 16 [100,90,50,0] [-50, -140, -270, 0, 1680, 1680] 2900
The uplift payment for the generators can be easily calculated as $50, $140, $270,
and $0. All the committed generators lose money without uplift payment, and the
distribution of utility is very lopsided toward consumers, who have very high sur-
pluses. This small example illustrates that the marginal cost pricing scheme does not
take into account the fixed generation cost, and the social welfare maximization could
potentially provide discriminating solutions that sacrifice utilities of certain partici-
pants in order to gain an overall high utility for the system. Both of these features
are critical in causing the uplift problem.
The current make-whole payment approach can be seen as a way to redistribute
utility among generators and consumers. Although it is easy to implement, the make-
whole payment is an out-of-narket action, and seems rather ad hoc. There are several
recent proposals that aim to solve the problem by a more systematic approach. For
instance, certain "commitment ticket prices" were introduced for binary commitment
variables in [67]; "stay-online" was considered as a type of service in addition to
electricity, and dual variables of some artificial "no-load constraints" were defined
as "6no-load clearing price" in [88]: dual variables of the mixed integer unit commit-
ment problem were used as electricity price in [50, 44], where it was shown that the
resulted electricity price minimizes the total uplift payments defined to cover both
the production costs and the lost opportunity costs (it is worth noticing that this
definition of uplift payment is different from the current ISO definition.) A detailed
comparison of the above three proposals can be found in [59]. All these schemes keep
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the social welfare maximization as the auction objective and determine the electricity
price using dual variables of either a linear economic dispatch problem with additional
artificial constraints, or a mixed integer unit commitment problem to reflect integer
decisions in the electricity price, which can be viewed as an extension of the marginal
cost pricing idea.
However as we pointed out, both the social welfare maximization auction and the
marginal cost pricing scheme contribute to the presence of the uplift payment. To
resolve this issue, essentially a certain form of redistribution of utility must occur
among the players. A new angle to look at the problem is to consider the fairness
property of the auction and pricing outcomes. In the next section, we introduce a new
auction and pricing formulation based on the notion of max-min fairness. Under this
scheme, the uplift problem is naturally resolved. Then, we consider the important
issue of tradeoff between economic efficiency and fairness, and propose the notion of
3-fairness and a family of new auction and pricing schemes.
4.3 Max-Min Fairness Based Electricity Market
Design
4.3.1 Fairness Concepts
Fairness issues in resource allocation problems have been extensively studied in many
areas, notably in social sciences, welfare economics, and some engineering applications
such as network commnunication[60, 651, air traffic flow management[19, 84], and some
financial management problems [56]. Many principles of resource allocation have been
proposed over the years, from the oldest theory of justice by Aristotle's equitable prin-
ciple that allocates the resources in proportion to some pre-existing claims or rights
that the participants have, to 18th century classical utilitarianism founded by Jeremy
Bentham that dictates an allocation of resources that maximizes the total utilities, to
Nash's proposal [63 , which allows a transfer of resources between two participants if
the gainer's utility increases by a larger percentage than the loser's utility decrease,
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to John Rawls's theory of justice [72] and Kalai-Smorodinsky's solution concept [54]
in bargaining problems, both of which give priority to the participants that are the
least well off, so to ensure the highest minimum level of utility that every participant
derives. For a comprehensive review and an investigation of the price of fairness in
resource allocation problems see [17].
Aristotle's equitable principle has been widely used in situations where partici-
pants have specific pre-existing rights to the resources such as in the case of profit
sharing between the shareholders. This is not the case for scheduling and trading
electricity in a deregulated electricity market. Therefore, Aristotle's principle is not
considered further. Bentham's utilitarianism is also extensively used in resource al-
location problems especially when the sum of all the utilities serves as a measure of
system efficiency. In fact, as mentioned in the first section, it has been adopted as the
auction scheme in ISO's electricity markets. However, the utilitarianism approach has
been criticised for its fairness properties, because some participants may suffer greatly
reduced utilities in order to confer a benefit to the system, as we demonstrated in the
simple example in Section 4.2. Nash's comparison principle and Kalai-Smorodinsky's
solution concept, are both derived from rigorous axiomatic foundations, see also [17].
We next introduce the concept of max-min fairness and an optimization formu-
lation for finding such a solution. We refer to Appendix (Section 4.8) for a formal
discussion of the basic properties of max-min fairness.
4.3.2 Max-Min Fairness
Let Q be the set of all achievable utilities in a resource allocation problem with n
participants. Let u be a vector of utility allocation, u - (Ui, 02, . . . , un) E Q. Then,
u is lexicographically greater than or equal to another v E Q, denoted as u Ix V, if
i1 2 vi, or if u1 = vi and U2 > V2, or if 11 = Vi, U2 = v 2 and a3 > v 3 , etc. In other
words, the first component of a vector is compared first, whose order determines the
order of the two vectors. If the first components are equal, the second components are
compared, and so on. Ve denote the problem of finding a lexicographically maximum
vector as lexmaxUEQ (Ui, 02,. .,un).
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If we sort u in a nondecreasing order, and denote the sorted version as
(U(1), U(2), - - . , U(n)),
the max-min fairness solution is defined as an optimal solution to the following lexmax
problem,
lexmaxEQ (UMi), U(2), . - - ,u(n)). (4.1)
Intuitively, a max-min fairness solution first maximizes the lowest utility level among
all the participants, then maximizes the second lowest utility level while ensuring
every participant derives at least the lowest level utility, and so on. Notice that
(4.1) involves sort operation, which is highly nonlinear. The following equivalent
formulation is more convenient to work with (see Lemma 15 in the Appendix).
lexmax (ri - eTsi, 2r 2 -e T 2 ... nrn-e sn)
s.t. ric-si<u. Vi =1,...,n,
si;>0, Vi=1,...,n,
u 
- Q.
Let (r*, s*..r*, s* ) and u* be an optimal solution to the above problem. Then
u* is a max-min fairness solution, and kr* - eTs* is the sum of the first k smallest
utilities of u*. Thus, the sorted utilities are given as u = r* - eTs* and u -
(kri - e si) - ((k - 1)ri? - e s-_,) for all k = 2..., n. The above formulation
suggests a simple algorithm that iteratively solves for each level of the sorted utility.
In fact, it is proven that the max-min fairness solution cannot be obtained by a single
optimization problem.
A simple iterative algorithm for max-mi fairness:
1. For k = 1, solve the following problem to obtain the smallest level of utility in a
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max-min fairness solution,
t* = max r1-eTsi
s.t. rie - s i < u,
Si > 0,
uEQ.
2. For k > 2, keep the previous k - 1 smallest utility levels and solve for the k-th
level. The variables are r1 , .. . , r, S1,..., sk, and u,
* = max krk - e Sk
r,s7u
s.t. jrj - e s ;j> t, Vj=l,..., k -1,
rje - sj < U, Vj =1.,k,
s;>0, Vj=1.-k,
u E Q.
3. At k n. the max-min fairness solution is obtained.
It is worth mentioning that t*1 < t* < ... < t*, as t* is the sum of the first k
smallest utilities.
4.3.3 Max-min Fairness Auction and Pricing Scheme
Assume N generators and I consumers participate in the market. Denote g
{1,. . ., N} as the index set of generators, and 'D = {N+1, ... , N+M} for consumers.
As discussed in Section 4.2, the ISO has bidding information of each generator's cost
function Cj, production range p ,pJ, and each consumer's value function Bi, demand
123
range di, di. We propose the following max-min fairness auction and pricing scheme,
(MMF) lexmax (r1 - eTs1 , 2r 2 - eTs 2 , . ., (N + M)rN+M - eT SN+M) (4.2)
s.t. rk - Ski < Api - Ci(pi, xi), Vi E 9, k E G U D, (4.3)
rk - ski < Bi(di) - Adi,Vi E D, k E g U D, (4.4)
Sk > 0, VkcguD, (4.5)
eTp - e'd = 0, (4.6)
P xi < pi < Pixi, ViE g, (4.7)
d < di < di, Vi D, (4.8)
A>0,xiE(0,1}, ViEg. (4.9)
Constraint (4.6) is the energy balance equation. (4.7) and (4.8) are production and
consumption limits for generators and consumers. Note that the lower consumption
level of a consumer is always zero, following the current bidding practice, i.e., d = 0
for all i. Thus, no binary variables are required for loads.
The above max-min fairness problem can be solved by applying the simple iterative
algorithm outlined in the previous subsection. In particular, we have the following
algorithm.
1. k = 1, maximize the minimum utility level: t* denotes the maximized minimum
utility level.
(AIMM 1) t* max ti
s.t. t1  AIpi - Ci(pi, xi), Vi E
t i < Bi(di) - Aidi, Vi E D,
e p - edd = 0,
d < di < di, Vi E D.
A 2 0,x i E {0, 1}, ViEg .
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2. k = 2, . .. , N+M, t* is the maximized k-th smallest utility level, while ensuring
the first (k - 1) smallest utility levels are at least t*,. . .t*
(AMF) t*,= max krk - eTSk
s.t. rj - si < AkAp - Ci(Pi, Xi), Vi E g,Vj = 1,..., k,
rj - si < Bj(d) - Akdj, Vi E D,Vj = 1,..., k,
jrj - eTsj > t* , Vj = 1, ... , k - I,
s3 > 0, Vj = I, ..., k,
eTp - ed = 0,
pxi _p < pixi, ViE g,
d di < di, Vi E D,
Ak > 0, Xj E (0, 1, ViEg.
3. k N + Ml, the optiial solution (x*, p*, d*) of (AIAIFN+AI) is the final max-min
fairness auction decision, and the final electricity price A* = A*
Each (AIMMFh.) is a mixed-integer optimization problem with nonlinear constraints
caused by the terms Akpi and Ad4. To solve (MMFIk), we use a two-level strategy:
first fix the price variable Ak and solve the corresponding linear M1IP by a commercial
solver such as CPLEX, then search over Ak which is a one-dimensional variable. Some
special properties of (MMFA.) are shown in the next subsection that help make the
computation more efficient.
4.3.4 Properties of the MMF Scheme
In this subsection, we explore various properties of the proposed NIIF scheme from
both economic and computational perspectives. In particular, we study the effect
of the MIF scheme on utility distribution and uplift payment, and the behavior of
the electricity price and its implication (Theorem 10, Lenna 7, and Corollary 1).
Structural properties of the subproblem (AMFk), such as the activity of market
players. the quasi-convexity and continuity of the first k smallest utility as a function
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of Ak, are discussed in Lemmas 8, 9, and 10. These properties are exploited in the
solution algorithm to accelerate the computation.
Theorem 10. t* > 0 for all k - 1,..., N + M. Thus, the uplift payment is always
zero.
Proof. Observe that the zero solution, (A, x, p, d, r, s) = 0, is feasible for (MMF)
problem, where every participant's utility is zero. This zero solution must be domi-
nated in lexicographic order by the utilities of the max-min fairness solution. There-
fore, the minimum level utility must be nonnegative, i.e., t* > 0, which implies every
generator and consumer has a nonnegative utility in the max-min fairness solution.
Thus, each generator's production cost including both variable and fixed costs is fully
covered by its electricity revenue. The uplift payment is always zero in a max-min
fairness solution. ]
This is a simple but important result. Among various forms of fairness, the max-
min fairness is regarded as the strongest. Our results show that improving the fairness
property of the auction and pricing solution is effective in resolving the uplifty pay-
ment problem. Another interesting implication is that if some consumer has a fixed
demand regardless of the electricity price, then the all zero solution may not be fea-
sible for the (MMF) problem anymore, and the uplift payment can again be positive.
This indicates that increasing demand responsiveness is helpful in reducing uplift
payment in the max-min fairness scheme.
Next, we characterize the electricity price in the MMF scheme. The production
cost function C (pj, xj) of a generator includes the variable cost and the fixed cost
such as startup and no-load costs. We assume a simple case where both generators
and consumers have single-block bids. Then, the utility of a generator j is u=
(A - c)pj - f , where cj is the variable cost and fj is the fixed cost. The utility of
a consumer i is ui = (bi - A)dj, where bi is consumer i's valuation of electricity. We
call a committed generator or a served load an active participant.
Lemma 7. The final electricity price A* satisfies
mrax (c + )< A* < min b,. (4.10)
j active pi i active
Proof. To avoid triviality, we assume there exists at least one nonzero feasible solution
to the (MMF) problem. Then the active participants in the final auction decision
must have positive utilities, i.e., (A - cj)pj - f3 > 0 and (bi - A)di > 0, therefore,
c. + f < A < bi, for all active i, J's. D
The above lemma shows that the final electricity price is strictly higher than the
average cost (thus marginal cost) of any active generator. This 'premium' over the
variable production cost provides sufficient revenue for active generators to recover
their fixed cost.
Furthermore, the price is strictly lower than the valuation of electricity of any
active consumer. We assume a linear valuation function Bi(di) = bidi in the lenma.
However, for a more general Bi(di), a similar relationship holds as A < BBi(di)/&di for
any active demand i. This clearly shows that the price sensitivity of demand strongly
affects the final electricity price. In the industry, there is a consensus that increasing
demand-side responsiveness will help lower the electricity price. This lemma rigor-
ously demonstrates this effect in the max-min fairness auction and pricing scheme.
From (4.10), it may seem that the generators can simply increase their bidding
costs or consumers can decrease their offer price to manipulate the price. However,
because only active participants affect the price and who will be active is not known
a priori, naive manipulation of price may put them in disadvantage. An analogy can
be found in the traditional MaxSW-MCP market: since generators do not know in
advance who will be the marginal unit, simply increasing the bid cost might make
the generators not committed. It is an interesting topic to systematically study the
bidding behavior in a max-min fairness market.
The following corollary of Lemma 7 shows that bids of excessively high cost or
offers of excessively low valuation will not be active.
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Corollary 1. In the max-min fairness scheme, a generator is not committed if its bid
cost is higher than every consumer's offer price. Similarly, a consumer is not served
if its offer price is lower than every generator's bid cost.
Proof. Because the served consumers' offer prices and the committed generators' costs
are strictly separated by the electricity price shown in Lemma 7. D
Since the electricity price A is a decision variable in the (MMF) problem, each sub-
problem (MMF) is a bilinear mixed integer optimization problem. Solve (MMFk)
is nontrivial. In the following, we show some properties of the (MMF) problem that
are useful for simplifying computation.
A participant that is active at one level might not be active in the following levels.
However, in the following case. all participants are active in the final max-min fairness
solution, and the integrality constraints in the MMF problem can be dropped.
Lemma 8. If t* > 0, then all participants are active, and at subsequent levels, all
participants remain active.
Proof. A participant's utility is positive if only it is active. In subsequent levels, all
participants must remain active to have nonzero utility, since t* > t* > 0. O1
On the other hand, t* = 0 implies that, for any electricity price A,, there is always
a participant who would have a negative utility if it becomes active. When t* = 0,
the electricity price A, is not uniquely defined. Therefore, the first level k that has
t* > 0 is important in determining the final electricity price. At this level, we can
discard the first (k - 1) players that have zero production and consumption levels,
and set the rest players to be active, thus reduce the situation to the case of t* > 0.
Without loss of generality, we can analyze the property of ti(A) as a function of A,
which can be writen in a more compact form as follows,
ti(A) = max min{(A - cj)pj - fj.. (bi - A)di, . . .1} (4.11)
(pd)EY
where Y is the polytope of the feasible p and d, defined by constraints (4.6)-(4.8).
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Definition (4.11) might seem to suggest a piecewise linear structure of ti(A). In-
terestingly, this is not the case. Simple examples show that ti (A) is piecewise dif-
ferentiable, but some pieces can have nonzero curvature. Function ti (A) can be also
written as a standard linear optimization problem with constraint matrix linearly
parametrized by a single variable A. This type of problems with general matrices
are discussed in [38], which shows that t1(A) could be nonconcave and even discon-
tinuous. Fortunately, the special structure of our problem makes ti(A) a continous
quasi-concave function.
Lemma 9. The function t 1 (A) is quasi-concave in. A E [maxi ci, minj bj.
Proof. Define a function h(-y, p, d) = min{fy pj - fL,... , yjdj, . . } with domain 'y >
0, p > 0, d > 0, and f;'s are nonnegative constants. Then h(y, p, d) is a quasi-
concave function, because the upper level set {(-, p, d) I h(7, p, d) 2 r, (y, p, d) > 0}
is a convex set.
Define an affine transformation as yj -+ 'y-c, 7_ -+ by -- yj, pi -+ pi, di -> dj on the
same domain, i.e., 'Yi - ci > 0 and by - > 2 0, p, > 0, dj > 0. The resulting function
h(-y, p, d) is still quasi-concave. Then, restricting all -v= A where max c < A <
minm bj, h(A. p, d) is quasi-concave in (A, p, d). Then, t1 (A) = max(p~d)EY h(A, p, d) is
quasi-concave. D
For the continuity of ti (A), we have the following more general result.
Lemma 10. Assume function .f(x, y) is jointly continuous in (X, y) E dom(f) and
C is a compact set in R"' then g(x) := maxyc f(x, y) is continuous in dom(g).
Proof. VX 1 , X 2 c dom(g), we have
|g(Xi) - g(X2)|= I |max f(iy) - max f(x 2 , y)
-YEC yEc
< mnaxif (Xi, Y) -- f(X2 Y)-
Since f(x, y) is jointly continuous in (x, y) and C is compact, f(x, y) is uniformly
continuous on C. Hence, Ve > 0, there exists 6 > 0. such that if(xi, y) --f(x 2, Y)I < e
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for any ||(x1,yi) - (x2,y 2)|| < 6. Therefore, jf(x 1,y) - f(x 2,y) < E, for any
|(xi, y) - (x2, y)| = X1 - X211 <_ 6.
Based on our computational experience, we conjecture that ti(A) is actually con-
cave in the domain where ti(A) is strictly positive, and ti (A) has a unique maximizer.
The quasi-concavity and continuity of ti (A) makes the one dimensional maximization
problem over A easier than the case of a general nonconcave function. Using the
results from [38], we can do a binary search over A to find the maximizer.
We can compute the MMF solution of the simple example of four generators and
two consumers given in Section 4.2. Both MaxSW and MMF solutions are listed
below. Two consumers are served at the maximum level di, so they are omitted from
the table.
Scheme Price Production Utilities SW
MaxSW 16 [100,90,50.0] [-50, -140, -270, 0, 1680, 1680] 2900
MMF 27.0945 [50,44.043,57.895,88.062] [454.72,348.63, ", ", ", "] 2197.89
The notation " means the last four utilities are all equal to 348.63. In the MaxSW
solution, the electricity price is set by generator 2. The utility distribution among
generators and loads is quite uneven. All three active generators have negative util-
ities [-50, -140, -270], i.e. their production costs are not covered by electricity
revenues. The MMF solution has a higher electricity price $27.0945. All generators
are committed, and are making positive profit, therefore no uplift payment is needed
as anticipated by Theorem 10.
In the max-min fairness scheme, utilities are more equalized between generators
and consumers. An inevitable consequence of the improved fairness is the relative
reduction in system efficiency. In fact, as shown in the table, the social welfare of
the max-min fairness solution is $2197.94, about 75.8% of the MaxSW solution. In
general, the social welfare of a. fairness solution is lower than that of an MaxSW
solution. While it is desirable to improve the fairness of an auction solution, it is
also important to achieve a high economic efficiency. In the next section, we propose
a notion of 3-fairness and a family of auction and pricing schemes, which explicitly
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explores the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency. The max-min fairness scheme
proposed in Subsection 4.3.3 is a special realization of this family.
4.4 0-Fairness
Since the max-min fairness solution may incur low social welfare, and the MaxSW
solution suffers from fairness issues, we propose a notion of -fairness that interpolates
these two extremes. The following is the definition of s-fairness in an algorithmic
framework.
1. Fix a # E [0, 1). For k = 1, solve the following problem,
(PI) max (1 - 3) (B (dj) - Ci(pi, xi) + 3t1
s-t. ti Aip, - Ci(pi, Xi), Vi E 9,
ti Bi (dj) - AId i , V E D,
e lp - e7id = 0,CP Cd 0,
pX 1 li Apixi, Vi C,
di di < di, Vi E D,
A2 . 0Forxi E o, 1}, VI p E
2. For k =2,. ... , N + A]I solve the following problem,
(Pa) max (1 -#) Bj(dj) -( C(pix) + 3(krk - e'
\iED iEg
s.t. ry - sp < Akpi - Ci(pixi), Vi C G, Vj =, ... , k,
r - s Bi < B1 (dj) - Ad1 , Vi E D, Vj 1. k,
jri - eT s ;> t*,j Vj ... , k - 1,
Si > 0, Vj=1,...,k,
s3)
e Tp - eTd = 0,
xi A p Ax ii, Vi E G
di < di < d, Vi E D,
Ak >0, i E {07I, Vi Eg.
Let Rk be the set of optimal (r*, s*) of the above problem.
Let t* +- max(r*,s*)Eak{krk - e s[}.
The final auction and pricing solutions are obtained at stage N + M, denoted as
(z* 1p * , d* , A*).
In the following, we first show that the solution of the above /-fairness trade-
off scheme is Pareto optimal. To prove for a general setting, we use the notation
introduced in Section 4.3.2: Let Q be the set of all achievable utilities in a re-
source allocation problem with n participants. Let u be a vector of utility allocation,
u = (u 1 ,. .12 .- un) E Q, and (ut(i), U(2), u(,)) is the utility sorted in a nonde-
creasing order. Then, the k-th level problem in the 3-fairness scheme can be written
as,
n k
(Ps) max (1-j)Zui + u(i)
s.t. Z t) t> j=1. k-i
aQ.
Theorem 11. Let u* be an optimal solution of the 3-fairness tradeoff scheme. Then.
U* is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose u* is not Pareto optimal, then there exists another utility vector
u E Q such that ni > u* for all i =. n and for at least one i, ui > u. Then, we
have E" ua > E' U*.
Now we want to show that the sorted version of u also dominates the sorted version
of u*, i.e., uj) > u*) for all i. Without loss of generality, assume u* is already sorted,
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i.e., u = u() for all i. For a specific i E {1,.. . , n}, let j be the original position of
u(i), that is, u(i) = uj, and let k be the sorted position of ui, i.e., ui = utk). If j i,
then (L(*) 2u; 2 - U). Ifj < i and k < i, then ) (k) = i > * = Ui)
If j < i and k > i, then among u(i),..., u(i_1), at least one of them is from an element
in ui 1, .... t,, i.e., there exists a E 1, . .. t, - 1} and b E {i + 1, ... , n} such that
U(a) = Ub. Then, u(i) U(a) = Ub > ub - Ui = U. Therefore, uw > vu. for all i.
Hence, for any j = 1,..., k - 1, it holds that >Ie uti) > E Uj > t5. Thus,
u is a feasible solution of the tradeoff scheme. But K" ui + Eje u(i) > E" Ua +
E3- u), which contradicts with the optimality of u*. As a special case, this also
shows the well-known fact that the max-min fairness solution (for 3 = 1) is Pareto
optimal.
The parameter # controls the degree of tradeoff between the social welfare and
fairness. The case # - 1 is the max-min fairness scheme proposed in Subsection 4.3.3.
When / approaches zero, more weight is put on the social welfare part. In particular,
we have the following property of t* that is analogous to the fairness solution.
Lemma 11. t* maximizes the sum of the first k smallest utilities among all the
optimal solutions of (P4).
Proof. For each optimal solution (r*, s* , u*) of the problem (P), by Lemma 14 (see
Appendix), (kr* - e s*) is equal to the sum of the first k smallest utilities. Since
we choose t* as max(.,,-)c f{kr* - es*}, t* is the maximum over all the optimal
solutions. L1
Theorem 12. Let Zk(/3) be the optimal value of the tradeoff scheme (P4), and Z* be
the maximum. social welfare of the MaxSW scheme. Then, the following limit holds
for all k = 1,..,N,
lin Zk() Z*.
Proof. It suffices to show that Zk() is continuous in /3 at i3 = 0. Notice that
the parameter 3 is only in the objective function, and does not affect the feasible
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region. Using perturbation theory developed in [25, Proposition 4.41, a set of sufficient
conditions for the continuity of Zk(3) are: (a) the objective function
f(p, d, X, r, s,3) :=(1 -p3) Bi(di) -- Ci(pi, xi) + 0(krk - eTsk)
\iED iEg
is continuous in (p, d, x, r, s, #); (b) the feasible region of Problem (Pk) is closed and
bounded.
Condition (a) is guaranteed by the continuity of Bi(di) and Ci(pi, xi), especially
if we only consider linear functional form for Bi(di) and Ci(pi, xi), i.e., Bi(di)
bidi, Ci(pi, xi) = cipi + fixi. For Condition (b), the original feasible region is closed,
but unbounded, because r, s, A may take arbitrarily large values. However, we can
restrict their values without affecting the optimal value. The price A can be limited as
0 < A < maxiED bi, since the optimal price must be below the highest offer price from
consumers. From the production and consumption level constraints, we know the
feasible region for (p, d, x) is closed and bounded, combining with the boundedness
of A, it implies that the set of possible utilities is closed and bounded, independent
of /.
By Lemma 11, for any fixed 0, the optimal (jr* - eTsj) is equal to the sum of the
first j smallest optimal utilities. Then, we can apply Lemma 14 (proved in Appendix)
that u> < rj < u*,), 0 sp < utj+1) - uz for I E {(1).... (j)} (i.e., for all i such
that un is among the first j smallest utilities), and sp, - 0 for all other i's. Since
the utility set is bounded, r; and s* are bounded for all j 1,. . . , k. Therefore, the
entire feasible region of (Ps) is closed and bounded, independent of 3. D
The above theorem confirms with the intuition that as 3 -+ 0, the tradeoff scheme
converges to the MaxSW scheme. However, notice that this convergence is not trivial
in the sense that the continuity of the objective function alone is not sufficient to
guarantee the continuity of the optimal value. The compactness of the feasible region
is also crucial (see discussion in [25, Section 4.1]).
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Production
[50, 44.0, 57.9, 88.1]
[50,44.0,57.9, 88.1]
[50, 44.0, 57.9, 88.1]
[55.9. 60.5, 83.3, 40.3]
#
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.069
0.068
0.05
MaxSW
Price
27.1
27.1
27.1
26.1
25.4
25.4
25.4
24.9
25.4
25.9
27.45
27.47
27.47
16
Utilities
[454.7,348.7, 348.7, 348.6, 348.7]
[454.7, 348.7, 348.6, 348.6, 348.7
[454.7, 348.6, 348.6, 348.6, 348.6]
[469.9, 469.8, 469.8, 64.7, 469.9]
[548.8,548.7, 522.6, 0, 535.2]
[550.2, 550.0, 520.1,0, 548.9]
[550.3,549.6, 520.7,0, 548.7]
[627.4, 626.7,303.3, 0, 626.2]
[712.1,712.1,303.5,0, 553.2]
[781.9, 781.9, 303.5 ,0, 492.0]
[1095, 889.1, 303.5, 0, 306]
[1097, 892.3. 303.5, 0. 303.6]
[1097, 892.3, 303.5, 0. 303.6]
[-50, -140, -270. 0. 1680
Table 4.1: #-fairness tradeoff schemes for the simple example. For each #, the first
four utilities are the utilities of generators; the last one is the consumer utility (since
both consumers have the same utility, only one is shown).
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[67.0, 73.0,
[67.2. 73.2,
[67.2, 73.2,
[79.5, 87.3,
[83.0, 90.7,
[85.5, 93.1,
[100, 89.9,
[100, 90,
[100, 90,
[100, 90,
99.9,
99.6,
99.7,
73.2,
66.3,
61.4,
50.1,
50, 0]
50, 0]
50, 0]
SW
2197.9
2197.9
2197.9
2414.1
2717.2
2718.3
2718.1
2809.8
2813.1
2851.4
2899.6
2900
2900
2900
We apply the tradeoff formulation to the simple example of four generators and two
consumers. The solutions for different 3's are shown in Table 4.1. The consumption
levels are ignored, since the consumers are always served at d.
As shown in the table, the social welfare of the tradeoff solutions increases when #
decreases to 0. The utility vectors of larger #'s tend to dominate the utility vectors of
smaller /'s in lexicographic order. These reflect the decrease in fairness as # decreases
to 0. Also notice that none of the tradeoff solutions needs any side payments, while
the MaxSW scheme requires considerable side payments of $50, $140, $270 for the
three committed generators.
As / approaches 0, social welfare of the tradeoff solution converges to the maxi-
mum level achieved by the MaxSW solution (see # = 0.05), as expected from Theorem
12. Note that the production levels also converge to the MaxSW solution, and the
corresponding electricity price is strictly higher than the MaxSW price.
Also notice that there exists a 3o = 0.068, such that for all 3 in the range 0 <
# 0, the tradeoff scheme achieves maximum social welfare, as well as the same
production levels as in the laxSW solutions. Furthermore, the fairness property of
the tradeoff solution is strictly better than the MaxSW-MCP scheme reflected by the
more even distribution of utilities, and the side payment is zero, which is strictly less
than the current practice.
This property of the 3-fairness tradeoff scheme has an important implication on
another long noticed problem in the current practice, namely, how to achieve fairness
and integrity in choosing from numerous optimal or near-optimal MaxSW solutions
[53, 48]. Although all these solutions have the same system level social welfare,
choosing one solution from others could have significant financial implications on the
welfare of individual generators and consumers. The current practice does not impose
any criteria in choosing one unit commitment solution from other solution candidates.
In fact, it is nontrivial to even compute all the (near) optimal solutions. Our proposed
tradeoff scheme provides a solution to this problem. When /3 < 3o, as shown in the
above table, the tradeoff solution achieves the optimal social welfare and max-min
fairness. In other words, in accordance with well formulated fairness principle, the i3-
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fairness tradeoff scheme automatically selects the most fair solution from potentially
numerous maximum social welfare solution candidates. Furthermore, this is done
without explicitly computing other social welfare solutions.
In the next section, we further explore this convergent property of the #-fairness
scheme and propose a decoupled, sequential auction and pricing model that achieves
maximum social welfare and strictly improved fairness with the advantage of much
simplified computation.
4.5 Efficient Fairness Pricing Scheme
As shown in Theorem 12 and the computational experiment, when # -+ 0, the #-
fairness tradeoff solution achieves the same level of maximum social welfare as the
MaxSW scheme, but strictly improves the fairness and lowers (or eliminates) the side
payment. However, if 3 is exactly equal to zero, the objective function of Problem
(Pk) only has social welfare and loses control over the fairness term, thus the electricity
price is not properly constrained. This suggests an interesting 'limiting' auction and
pricing scheme, where the auction follows the laxSW practice, and the electricity
price is determined by the max-min fairness principle. We call such a pricing scheme
efficient fairness (EF). In particular, we propose the following auction and pricing
scheme,
1. Auction: Maximize social welfare.
(AEF) max E Bi(di) - E Ci(pi, xi)
iED icG
s.t. e Tp - eid = 0,
App - Add < f,
ixi - pi <- Pixi, VII E g,
d < di < di, Vi D,
A 0, xi E {o,1, ViEg.
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Denote the optimal solution as (*EFI PEF, dEF).
2. Pricing: Fix an auction solution and solve for electricity price. Denote the
optimal electricity price as AEF-
(PEF) t: max t
s.t. t < Ap' - Ci(p* x*), Vi E g and active,
t < Bi(d') - Ad*, Vi E D and active.
The pricing step chooses an electricity price that maximizes the minimum utility level
among the active players (i.e., committed generators and served consumers). In the
following, we will show this achieves the max-min fairness solution, thanks to the
uniqueness of the electricity price in this pricing model. The pricing scheme is a
simple linear optimization problem.
Theorem 13. The pricing problem (PEF) has a unique solution A*, under which the
obtained utility is a max-min fairness solution.
Proof. The pricing problem (PEF) can be written as
maxmin{Ap* - (cjp + f), - - -, bid* - Ad, ...
A>O
for active generators and consumers i.e., pj* > 0, d* > 0. The objective is a piece-wise
linear concave function. The maximum is achieved at a breakpoint, where a linear
piece of a generator utility intercepts with another linear piece of a consumer utility.
Since the slope of each linear piece is nonzero, the interception is unique. Thus, the
(PEF) pricing model has a unique optimal electricity price A*. Any other price would
lead to a strictly lower minimum level utility. Therefore, the utility determined by A*
is a max-min fairness solution. E
For a fixed auction solution (p*, d*, z*), different pricing models, such as the
conventional marginal cost pricing, the convex-hull pricing of [50, 441, or the proposed
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EF pricing, determine potentially different prices to dictate the distribution of utility.
In fact, we can characterize the necessary and sufficient condition under which the
EF pricing has zero uplif payment.
Theorem 14. For an auction solution (p*, d*, x*), the efficient pricing model (PEF)
has zero uplift if and only if
max (ci + mn bi. (4.12)
j active p / i active
Proof. If the uplift payment is zero under EF price A*, then for any active generator
j, (A* - cj)p, - fj > 0, thus A* > cj + fl/pj. Also, for any active consumer i,
(b, - A*)d* > 0, hence A* < bi. Therefore, we have (4.12).
Conversely, we already know from previous theorem that the EF price A* is the
unique solution of the interception of a generator's utility and a consumer's utility.
Denote these two players as generator k and consumer 1, then (A* - ck)pk* - f-
(b - A*)d*, so A*= (ck + fk + bd*)/(p* + d*). If (4.12) holds, then c< + A/p. K bi.
Therefore, we have A* < bi, which implies that the minimum level utility (b, - A*)d* >
0, thus the uplift is zero. D
In fact, the above proof shows that (4.12) is a necessary condition for any pricing
scheme to have zero uplift payment. However, it may not be a sufficient condition for
certain pricing schemes. For example, recall the simple example of four generators
and two consumers. For the MaxSW auction solution [100,90, 50,0, 120. 120], the
average generation cost of active generators can be computed to be [16.5, 17.5., 21.4]
(the first three active generators), while the bid price of active consumers is 30.
Therefore, (4.12) holds for this solution. However, there is significant uplift payment
(all active generators need uplift) under marginal cost pricing, which means (4.12) is
not a sufficient condition for the MCP to have zero uplift. It turns out that (4.12)
is not a sufficient condition for the convex-lull pricing scheme proposed in [50, 44]
either. Indeed, the convex-hull price can be computed to be 20.2 in this case, and
the utilities of generators and consumers are [370, 238, -60, 0, 1176, 1176], so the third
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generator needs uplift. Note that we always adhere to the definition of uplift used in
the industry.
From the above discussion, the efficient fairness pricing scheme can be viewed
as a pricing scheme that is the most likely to have zero uplift. If (4.10) does not
hold, or equivalent if the efficient fairness pricing scheme has uplift, then there will
be uplift payment under any pricing scheme. If this happens, the EF pricing scheme
minimizes the largest uplift payment among all pricing schemes, because the minimum
level utility is maximized.
As a summary, our proposed schemes represent a complete spectrum that spans
from the maximum social welfare auction (MaxSW) and marginal pricing with no
fairness consideration (the current practice), to the MIF scheme with full max-min
fairness consideration. We proposed #-fairness scheme as a controlled tradeoff of
fairness and efficiency. When 3 is close to zero, we empirically showed that there
exists a So > 0 such that the maximum social welfare is achieved, the fairness is
strictly improved, and the uplift is eliminated or reduced. This also bears a significant
implication on a long noticed problem of choosing from multiple optimal UC solutions
to maintain certain fairness and integrity. In particular, the I-fairness tradeoff scheme
with < o can be used to automatically select a UC solution of maximum social
welfare and satisfies a well-defined fairness principle. We further proposed a Efficient
Fairness pricing scheme that achieves the maximum social welfare while impoving the
fairness property. We showed that among all possible pricing schemes, the EF pricing
scheme is the most likely to eliminate uplift payment. When there has to be uplift
under any pricing scheme, the EF scheme minimizes the largest uplift payment. In
the following section, we apply the proposed schemes to a large scale problem, and
introduce a frontier plot of efficiency versus fairness.
4.6 The Efficiency-Fairness Tradeoff Curve: An
Example Using Real-World Data
In this section, we apply our proposed schemes to an auction and pricing problem
of 143 supply bids and 109 demand bids in a single hour based on the bidding data
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of the day-ahead market operated by ISO New England. For simplicity, we only use
the first bidding block of each bid and price-sensitive bids. Transmission network
is assumed to be non-congested (which is the case as indicated by the published
data), therefore network constraints are omitted. Recall that our proposed scheme
is parametrized by a scalar quantity / (0 < # 1). The case / = 1 corresponds to
the max-min fairness scheme; # = 0 corresponds to the current ISO MaxSW-MCP
scheme; the intermediate values of / correspond to the tradeoff with an objective of
(1 - 3) - EFFICIENCY + / - FAIRNESS.
Scheme Social Welfare Scheme Social Welfare
MMF 64499.70 # = 0.3 80126.85
3 = 0.9 69593.76 EF 80267.25
# = 0.7 74677.97 MaxSW 80267.25
# = 0.5 75894.90
The above table shows the efficiency of the max-min fairness scheme (MMF), the
tradeoff scheme with t3 = 0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9, the EF scheme, and the current ISO's
MaxSW scheme. The social welfare, thus the efficiency, increases from MMF scheme
to MaxSW scheme. The Efficient Fairness (EF) scheme achieves the same social
welfare as the MaxSW scheme and strictly improves fairness properties.
Figure 4.6 shows four efficiency-fairness curves constructed from solutions of the
above seven schemes. In each curve, the efficiency of a solution is measured by its
total utility, and the fairness is quantified by one of the four well-known inequity
measures (See Figure 1 for definitions) [61]. Notice that higher value in the 'Fairness'
axis means more unfair.
We can see from Figure 1 that our proposal establishes a spectrum of tradeoff
between efficiency and fairness. At one end, the current practice MaxSW-MCP has
the highest efficiency, but suffers from the worst fairness property indicated by all four
inequity measures. At the other end, the max-min fairness scheme (0 = 1) achieves
the best fairness property with a 20% reduction in efficiency. In between, by varying
#, our proposed scheme significantly increases fairness while controlling the decrease
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Figure 4-1: Efficiency-fairness tradeoff curve. Let u be the utility vector of a solution
and U be its mean. Four inequity measures are defined as variance: Ei(ui - f)2
sum of absolute deviations: >j Ej I ui - ng|; reversed Jain's index: " ; Gini in-
Ei Ej ui-flu
dex: . In each plot, from the highest efficiency are the solutions of
the MaxSW-MP scheme, the limiting pricing scheme, and the tradeoff scheme with
# = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7,0.9.
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in social welfare. Moreover, the EF pricing scheme achieves the same efficiency as
the MaxSW-MP scheme, while improving the fairness. This suggests that the current
electricity market is not operating on the pareto frontier of efficiency versus fairness.
The efficiency-fairness curve generated by our schemes provides a valuable decision
tool for the ISO to identify a proper operating point of its market. For example, as
shown in Figure 1, the tradeoff scheme at 3 = 0.3 considerably improves fairness with
little decrease in efficiency. Thus, such a scheme could be a desirable candidate for
the ISO electricity market's operating policy.
4.7 Conclusion
Motivated by the evidence of unfairness revealed by the uplift problem, we introduced
the well-defined max-min fairness concept into the electricity market design problem,
and proposed the max-min fairness (MF) auction and pricing scheme. Various
computational and economic properties of this scheme are investigated. An important
outcome is that under the IMF scheme, the uplift payment is always zero.
Then, we proposed a new notion of -fairness auction and pricing scheme, which
explicitly trades off fairness and efficiency. We investigated the Pareto optimality
property of the solution, and the convergent behavior as # -4 0. We empirically
showed that there exists a range of 3 E (0, lo], where the tradeoff scheme achieves
the same level of social welfare as the MaxSW scheme, strictly improves the fairness,
and eliminates or reduces the uplift payment. An important implication is that
such a tradeoff scheme provides a solution to a long standing problem of the current
practice in choosing a proper solution from multiple optimal or near-optimal social
welfare solutions (as first raised in [53, 48]).
We further introduced efficient fairness pricing scheme as a limiting case of j -+0,
which decouples the auction and pricing, and simultaneously achieves the maxiumm
efficiency and the max-min fairness. We showed that the necessary condition for any
pricing scheme to have zero uplift payment is also sufficient for the EF scheme. In this
sense, the EF scheme is the most likely pricing scheme to eliminate uplift, payment.
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In the situation where the uplift is unavoidable by any pricing model, the EF scheme
minimizes the largest uplift payment among all possible pricing schemes.
We test our models on a large scale problem using data obtained from ISO-NE's
day-ahead electricity market. Using four well-known equity measures, we construct
efficiency-fairness curves, all of which show a consistent picture of tradeoff between
fairness and efficiency achieved by our models. A particularly revealing observation
shown by the efficiency-fairness curves is that the current ISO practice is not operating
on the Pareto frontier of efficiency versus fairness. Proposed #-fairness tradeoff scheme
and EF pricing scheme strictly improves fairness while obtaining the same level of
efficiency as the MaxSW scheme. These frontier curves can be a valuable tool to
facilitate the ISO decision in choosing a proper operating policy of its market.
4.8 Appendix: Max-Min Fairness
In the following, we introduce the definitions of lexicographical order, lexmax problem,
and the concept of max-min fairness. Then we discuss the formulation of max-min
fairness as a lexmax problem and the solution algorithm. Most of the properties and
formulations presented here have appeared in previous papers on fairness, including
[4, 26, 57] and a series of papers by Ogryczak [64, 65, 66].
Let Q be the set of all achievable utilities in a resource allocation problem. Let u
be a vector of utilities of all the participants of a resource allocation solution.
Definition 1. A vector U = (u1 ,'u2 , . ,un) E ]R" is lexicographically greater than or
equal to another v E R", denoted as u Ie, v. if and only if u1 > v 1 , or u1 = v1 and
'12 V2 , or Ui = Vi, U2 = v 2 and 113 v 3 ,. etc.
In other words, the first component of a vector carries the most weight and is
compared first. The order of the first components determines the order of the two
vectors. If the first components are equal, the second components are compared, and
so on.
Definition 2. Problem, leximaxuEQ (u1 2 . Un) is to find u E Q such that u iex
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v for all v E Q.
That is, the lexmax problem is an optimization problem under the lexicographical
order. We also use the notation (u(i), u(2), ... , u(n)) to denote a nondecreasing order
of the components of u, i.e., u(i) U(2 ) - - - _ U(n).
Definition 3. Given a utility set Q, an optimal solution to the lexmax problem,
lexrmaxUEQ (u(1), U(2),... , U(n)) (4.13)
is called a max-min fairness solution.
Intuitively, a max-min fairness solution first maximizes the lowest utility level
among all the participants, then maximizes the second lowest utility level while en-
suring every participant derives at least the lowest level utility, and so on. The
existence of the max-min fairness solution is guaranteed by the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Assume the utility set Q is compact. Then, the max-min fairness solu-
tion u* always exists and the ordered vector (u* ,u 2)- , U ) ) is unique.
Proof. Follow from the definition of lexmax and the fact that lexicographical order
is a complete order, i.e. any two vectors can be ordered by it. However, the max-
min fairness solution may not be unique. Consider a case where the utility set Q =
{(0, 1), (1, 0)}. Then both points are max-inn fair. 0
Notice that problem (4.13) is not a standard lexnax problem, because the objec-
tive involves sorting a utility vector, where the sorting itself is a nonlinear operator.
The following lemna gives an equivalent formulation that leads to a standard lexmax
problem shown in Lemma 15.
Lemma 13. An optimal solution of
71
(P) lexmaxUEQ (7(l), U(i) + U(2). U(i))
i1
is a max-mhin fairness solution and vice versa.
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Proof. If u* is a max-min fairness solution, and u is any given point in Q, then
u*) > u(1); if -li) = u(1), then u*2) > U(2), thus u*1) + u*2) U(1) + u(2), etc. So u* is
also an optimal solution to problem (P).
If u* is an optimal solution to problem (P), and u is any given point in Q, then
U(1) > u(1); if u*) - U(i), since u*1 ) + u*<) U(1) + u(2 ), then u* (2) and so on.
Therefore, (P) gives max-min fairness solutions. D
Lemma 14. Given u E IR" and 1 K k K n, ( u(i) can be found by the following
linear program and its dual,
k
Zui)=min {uTy|eTy=k,O<y<e},
i=1
=max {kr - eTs re - s <u, s > O}
where r R and s E R"n. Further, the following relation holds.
U(k) < r* < U(k+1)
0 < Si U (k+1) - u ,Vi E {(1). (k)
si = 0,Vi {(1),. (k)}.
Proof. The intuition for the primal LP is clear. For the dual LP, r - si < ui for all i.
thus summing over any subset Ik of k indices, we have kr - Eik si < iEk ut. Since
s>Okr- " s> 0 kr - Z i <i- Si < (2Ik, u1 for all Ik. therefore kr - (" si <
k u(i). By the complementary slackness, yj(r -si -ai) = 0 and (y - 1)sj = 0 for all
i. Hence, if yj = 1 (i.e. ui is among the first k smallest components of u, denoted as
i E {(1) . (k)}), then r -si = ui, r > ui; if y = 0, then si = 0, which implies r < Ui.
Therefore U(k) 5 r < U(k+1). For i E {(1). (k)}, 0 < si = r - u i U(k+1) - ui. For
other i, Si = 0.
Use Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, we have
Lemma 15. Let (r*, s,..., r*,s*) and u* be an optimal solution to the following
146
problem,
lexmax (r1 - eTs 1 , 2r 2 - eTs 2 , .. ., nr - eTs)
s.t. rie - si < U, Vi- 1, ... ,n,
si > 0. Vi = 1,. n,
U EQ.
Then u* is a max-min fairness solution, and the ordered utilities are a1 =-r - e1s*
and u* ) = (kr* - e s*) - ((k - 1)r*- eTs* 1 ) for all k = 2,. .. , n.
Several algorithms are proposed in [65] to solve the above lexmax problem. When
the utility set Q is a convex set, an efficient algorithm that uses the dual solution is
available. However, the electricity market auction and pricing problem is intrinsically
discrete and nonconvex. The following simple sequential algorithm is needed in this
case.
1. k = 1, solve
niax
s.t.
r 1 - eTs1
rie - Si < U,
Si > 0,
uEQ.
2. For k > 2, maximize krk - eTsk with constraints that keep the previous
k - 1 objective functions at its respective optimal values. The variables are
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ri,...,rk, Si,..., Sk, and u,
-* Max
r,s,u
krk - e sk
s.t. jrj - e Tsj ;> t* , Vj= 1,...k- 1,
re - s3 < u, Vj= 1,...,k,
Si > 0, Vj=1,...,k,
uEQ.
3. k = n gives a max-min fairness solution.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Research
In the first part of this thesis, we focus our attention on the security constrained
unit commitment (SCUC) problem, which is a key daily operation of any large scale
electric power system in both vertically integrated industry and deregulated electricity
markets. We proposed an adaptive robust model for the SCUC under nodal net
load uncertainty. The effectiveness of the robust approach is demonstrated by an
extensive computational study on the ISO New England's power system. Comparing
to the current reserve adjustment approach, the robust UC model has significant
improvement in economic efficiency, real-time operational reliability, and robustness
to uncertain demand distribution.
Many interesting research questions are open. It would be interesting to study
re-commitment that is adaptive to load forecast. We can easily adjust the parameters
such as d. in the uncertainty set and re-run our model for future re-commitment when
a better estimation of uncertainty is available. This could be very useful when the
system has high percentage of price responsive demand and variable supply. We al-
ready show that the robust solution significantly reduces the volatility of the dispatch
cost. It would be interesting to study the extent that the volatility in the energy price
is reduced. It would also be very interesting to model explicit correlation between
different uncertain loads, such as spatial correlation between adjacent wind farms, or
temporal correlation between consumption levels. Such correlation can be captured
by modeling covariance matrices in the uncertainty set.
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In the second part of the thesis, we studied the more general concept of finite
adaptability, and provided a geometric characterization of the power of robust and
finitely adaptable solutions for a rather general class of multistage stochastic and
adaptive optimization models. Some further directions can be pursued. For example,
it would be interesting to study the performance of affine decision rules in a general
multistage setting. What would be the key geometric quantity, if there is any, in
determining the bound?
In the third part of the thesis, we proposed and investigated the notion of 3-
fairness that addresses the tradeoff between social welfare and fairness for the day-
ahead electricity market auction and pricing. The case / = 0 corresponds to current
practice, whereas 3 = 1 corresponds to a solution that maximizes the minimum
utility among market participants, the so-called max-min fairness. Such a max-min
fair solution eliminates side payments, thus resolves the uplift payment problem. We
investigated the tradeoff curve, and showed that the current operational practice
(,3 = 0) is not Pareto efficient, while there is a #0 < 1, at which the social welfare is
the same as current practice, while the max-min fairness is strictly better, and the side
payments are strictly lower than current practice. This gives a solution to another
long standing problem of achieving fairness and integrity of the auction in choosing
from multiple (near) optimal solutions. We investigated the properties of such /-fair
solutions both theoretically and empirically. Several interesting directions are open
for future research. It is interesting to explore the transmission network effects and
locational pricing concept under the fairness framework. It is also interesting to study
the incentive property of the fairness scheme.
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